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Abstract
We build a model of ￿rm-level innovation, productivity growth and reallocation featuring
endogenous entry and exit. A key feature is the selection between high- and low-type ￿rms,
which di⁄er in terms of their innovative capacity. We estimate the parameters of the model using
detailed US Census micro data on ￿rm-level output, R&D and patenting. The model provides
a good ￿t to the dynamics of ￿rm entry and exit, output and R&D, and its implied elasticities
are in the ballpark of a range of micro estimates. We ￿nd industrial policy subsidizing either
the R&D or the continued operation of incumbents reduces growth and welfare. For example,
a subsidy to incumbent R&D equivalent to 5% of GDP reduces welfare by about 1.5% because
it deters entry of new high-type ￿rms. On the contrary, substantial improvements (of the order
of 5% improvement in welfare) are possible if the continued operation of incumbents is taxed
while at the same time R&D by incumbents and new entrants is subsidized. This is because
of a strong selection e⁄ect: R&D resources (skilled labor) are ine¢ ciently used by low-type
incumbent ￿rms. Subsidies to incumbents encourage the survival and expansion of these ￿rms
at the expense of potential high-type entrants. We show that optimal policy encourages the exit
of low-type ￿rms and supports R&D by high-type incumbents and entry.
JEL No. E2, L1, O31, O32 and O33
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Industrial policies that subsidize (often large) incumbent ￿rms, either permanently or when they
face distress, are pervasive. Many European governments have supported large ￿rms with the aim
of creating national champions (Owen, 2000; Lerner, 2012). The majority of regional aid also ends
up going to larger ￿rms because they tend to be more e⁄ective at obtaining subsidies (Criscuolo
et al., 2012). This industrial aid has grown substantially with the onset of the recent recession,
as exempli￿ed by the US bailout of General Motors and Chrysler in the Fall of 2008, which cost
an estimated $82 billion (Rattner, 2010). The European Union also spent massive amounts on its
bailouts, with e1.18 trillion (equivalent to 9.6% of EU GDP) going to aid in 2010 alone (European
Commission, 2011).
Despite the ubiquity of such policies, their e⁄ects are poorly understood. They may encourage
incumbents to undertake greater investments, increase productivity and protect employment (e.g.,
Aghion et al., 2012). But they may also reduce economic growth by discouraging innovation by
both entrants and incumbents and slowing down reallocation. The reallocation implications of such
policies may be particularly important because the existing literature attributes as much as 70%
or 80% of productivity growth in the United States to reallocation￿ exit of less e¢ cient and entry
of more e¢ cient ￿rms.1
An analysis of industrial policy subsidizing incumbents ￿rst needs to distinguish between dif-
ferent types of subsidies (e.g., subsidies to the operation of incumbents vs. those to incumbent
R&D). More importantly, it also needs to build upon an empirical and theoretical framework with
several crucial dimensions of ￿rm-level heterogeneity and ￿rm behavior. In particular: (1) this
framework must incorporate meaningful ￿rm heterogeneity in productivity, innovation behavior,
employment growth, and exit behavior (including potentially between small and large, and young
and old ￿rms); (2) it must combine innovation by incumbents and by entrants; (3) it must link
reallocation of resources to innovation; and (4) it must include an exit margin for less productive
￿rms (so that the role of subsidies that directly or indirectly prevent exit can be studied).
The ￿rst part of the paper develops such a framework and provides a characterization of equilib-
rium innovation and reallocation dynamics. The second part of the paper estimates the parameters
of the model and conducts policy experiments intended to shed light on the impact of di⁄erent
types of industrial policy.
1Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2000 and 2006) report that reallocation, broadly de￿ned to include entry and
exit, accounts for around 50% of manufacturing and 90% of US retail productivity growth. Within this, entry and
exit account for about half of reallocation in manufacturing and almost all of the reallocation in retail. These ￿gures
probably underestimate the full contribution of reallocation since entrants￿prices tend to be below industry average
leading to a downward bias in their estimated TFP (Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson, 2008). As a result the
contribution of reallocation to aggregate productivity growth in the US across all sectors is probably substantially
higher. Numerous papers looking at productivity growth in other countries also ￿nd a similarly important role for
di⁄erences in reallocation in explaining di⁄erences in aggregate productivity growth. For example, Hsieh and Klenow
(2009), Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2009) and Syverson (2011) discuss how variations in reallocation
across countries play a major role in explaining di⁄erences in productivity levels.
1Our model builds on the endogenous technological change literature (e.g., Romer, 1990, Aghion
and Howitt, 1992, Grossman and Helpman, 1991) and in particular, on Klette and Kortum￿ s (2004)
and Lentz and Mortensen￿ s (2008) models of ￿rm-level innovation, and also incorporates major
elements from the reallocation literature (e.g., Hopenhayn, 1992, 2012, Hopenhayn and Rogerson,
1993, Ericson and Pakes, 1995, Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008, Guner et al. 2008, Hsieh and
Klenow, 2009, Jones, 2011, Peters, 2012). Incumbents and entrants invest in R&D in order to
improve over (one of) a continuum of products. Successful innovation adds to the number of
product lines in which the ￿rm has the best-practice technology (and ￿creatively￿destroys the lead
of another ￿rm in this product line). Incumbents also increase their productivity for non-R&D
related reasons (i.e., without investing in R&D). Because operating a product line entails a ￿xed
cost, ￿rms may also decide to exit some of the product lines in which they have the best-practice
technology if this technology has su¢ ciently low productivity relative to the equilibrium wage.
Finally, ￿rms have heterogeneous (high and low) types a⁄ecting their innovative capacity￿ their
productivity in innovation. This heterogeneity introduces a selection e⁄ect as the composition of
￿rms is endogenous, which will be both important in our estimation and central for understanding
the implications of di⁄erent policies. We assume that ￿rm type changes over time and that low-type
is an absorbing state (i.e., high-type ￿rms can transition to low-type but not vice versa), which is
important for accommodating the possibility of ￿rms that have grown large over time but are no
longer innovative.
This selection e⁄ect is shaped by two opposing forces: on the one hand, old ￿rms will be
positively selected because low-type ￿rms are more likely to exit endogenously (e.g., Jovanovic,
1982, Hopenhayn, 1992); on the other hand, old ￿rms will be negatively selected because more of
them will have transitioned to the low-type status. The balance of these two forces will determine
whether young (and small) ￿rms are more innovative and contribute more to growth. This feature
also implies that the key dimension of reallocation in our model is that of skilled labor used for
R&D and for ￿xed operating costs. In particular, skilled labor is allocated for R&D across ￿rms
with di⁄erent types and between R&D and operating costs.
Our focus on the reallocation (and misallocation) of R&D inputs is di⁄erent from that of much
of the literature, which emphasizes the reallocation of production input. This focus is motivated
by the importance of innovation activities for economic growth. Our model separates R&D and
production inputs both for greater transparency and because the margin between R&D and non-
R&D activities for production workers seems secondary for the issues at hand.
Despite the various dimensions of ￿rm-level decisions, heterogeneity, and selection e⁄ects, which
will prove important in our estimation and quantitative exercises, we show that the model is
tractable and that much of the equilibrium can be characterized in closed form (conditional on the
wage rate, which does not admit a closed-form solution). This equilibrium characterization then
enables the estimation of the model￿ s parameters using simulated method of moments.
The data we use for estimation come from the Census Bureau￿ s Longitudinal Business Database
2and Census of Manufacturers, the National Science Foundation￿ s Survey of Industrial Research and
Development, and the NBER Patent Database. We design our sample around innovative ￿rms that
are in operation during the 1987-1997 period. As discussed in greater detail below, the combination
of these data sources and our sample design permits us to study the full distribution of innovative
￿rms, which is important when considering reallocation of resources for innovation, and to match
the model￿ s focus on R&D-based ￿rms. Our model closely links the growth dynamics of ￿rms to
their underlying innovation e⁄orts and outcomes, and we quantify the reallocation of resources
necessary for innovation.2 Our sample contains over 98% of the industrial R&D conducted in the
US during this period.
Figure 1A: Transition Rates Figure 1B: R&D Intensity
Figure 1C: Sales Growth Figure 1D: Employment Growth
Figures 1A-D summarize some speci￿c aspects of the aforementioned ￿rm-level heterogeneity
which we use in our estimations below. They show R&D expenditures by shipments, employment
growth and exit rates between small, large, young and old ￿rms. Small and large are distinguished
by the median employment counts in the sample by year; young and old are split by whether or
not the ￿rm is ten years old. A noteworthy pattern within our sample is that small and young
￿rms are both more R&D intensive and grow more.3 Thus, industrial policies that discourage
2Non-innovative ￿rms, by de￿nition, do not participate in this process nor do they compete for these resources;
hence having ￿rms that do not conduct innovation in the sample would create a mismatch between both our focus
and our model and the data. Though it would be possible to add another selection margin to the model whereby
non-innovative ￿rms choose to transition into innovation, this appears fairly orthogonal to our focus, and we view it
as an area for future work.
3Given our sample just described, these relationships are conditional on engaging in innovation (R&D or patenting),
and are in line with other works in this area, which also ￿nd that, conditional on innovation, small and young ￿rms
are more innovative and more productive/radical in research. See, for example, Acs and Audretsch (1988, 1990),
3the reallocation of resources towards newer ￿rms might indeed be costly in that they slow the
movement of R&D resources from less e¢ cient innovators (struggling incumbents) towards more
e¢ cient innovators (new ￿rms).
We compute 21 moments capturing key features of ￿rm-level R&D behavior, shipments growth,
employment growth and exit, and how these moments vary by size and age. We use these moments
to estimate the 12 parameters of our model. The model performs well and matches these 21
moments qualitatively (meaning that the rankings by ￿rm age and size are on target) and on the
whole also quantitatively. In addition, we show that a variety of correlations implied by the model
(not targeted in the estimation) are similar to the same correlations computed from the data.
Finally, we also evaluate the model by comparing the response of innovation to R&D expenditure
and R&D tax credits in our model to various micro and instrumental-variables estimates in the
literature and ￿nd that they are in the ballpark of these estimates.
We then use our model to study the e⁄ects of various counterfactual policies and gain insights
about whether substantial improvements in economic growth and welfare are possible. We ￿rst
look at the impacts of di⁄erent types of industrial policies: subsidies to incumbent R&D, to the
continued operation of incumbents and to entry. The main result here is that all these policies
have small e⁄ects, and in the case of subsidies to incumbents, these are negative e⁄ects both on
growth and welfare. For example, a subsidy to incumbent R&D equivalent to 5% of GDP reduces
growth from 2.24% to 2.16% and welfare (in consumption equivalent terms) by about 1.5%. A
subsidy equivalent to 5% of GDP to the continued operation of incumbents reduces growth by
exactly the same amount, but welfare by less, by about 0.8%. A subsidy equivalent to 5% of GDP
to entry increases growth and welfare, but again by a small amount (growth increases to 2.32% and
welfare by 0.63%).4 When we consider subsidies equivalent to 1% of GDP, all of these numbers are
correspondingly smaller.
These small e⁄ects might ￿rst suggest that the equilibrium of our model is approximately
optimal. Though they do indeed reveal that any deviation from optimality is not just related
to insu¢ cient R&D incentives (a typical occurrence in models with endogenous innovation), in
reality they mask a very substantial ine¢ ciency in equilibrium originating from the selection e⁄ect
discussed above. This can be seen in two ways. First, we compute the socially optimal allocation
chosen by a planner who controls R&D investments, and entry and exit decisions of di⁄erent types
of ￿rms. We ￿nd that such an allocation would achieve a 3:8% growth rate per annum (relative
to 2:24% in equilibrium) and a 6:46% increase in welfare. The social planner achieves this by
forcing low-type incumbents to exit at a very high rate and reducing their R&D, and increasing
Akcigit (2010), Akcigit and Kerr (2010), Cohen and Klepper (1996a,b), Corsino, Espa and Micciolo (2011), Lee and
Sung (2005) and Tether (1998). See also Haltiwanger et al. 2013) on the role of small and young ￿rms in job creation.
4We report the implications of subsidies equivalent to 5% of GDP to make the numbers easier to understand.
This underscores the limited magnitude of thehow small the growth and welfare implications of industrial policy. For
comparison, note that R&D tax credits to incumbents, the main form of R&D subsidy in the United States, was
about $8 billion in 2007, 2008 and 2009 (see http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Corporation-Research-Credit),
so about 0.06% of GDP.
4the R&D of high-type incumbents, thus inducing a strong selection from low-type ￿rms where the
productivity of skilled labor is low to high-type ￿rms. Second, we look at the e⁄ect of using optimal
levels of incumbent R&D, entrant and operation subsidy/tax. We ￿nd that with all three, or just
with taxes on continued operation of incumbents and subsidies to incumbent R&D, growth can
be increased to about 3.11% and welfare can be increased by almost 5%. This can be achieved
by having a huge tax on the continued operation of incumbents ombined with a modest subsidy
to incumbent R&D (between 12 and 17%). Such a policy strongly leverages the selection e⁄ect
just like what the social planner was able to achieve directly. In particular, the high tax on the
continued operation of incumbents encourages exit, but much more so for low-type ￿rms, and the
incumbent R&D becomes e⁄ectively directed towards high-type ￿rms (since the low-type ones are
exiting). If allowed, optimal policy also subsidizes entrants, but this is fairly marginal (about 6%,
equivalent to about 1% of GDP). Though entry and incumbent R&D play pivotal roles, it turns
out to be much better to support these by freeing resources from ine¢ cient, low-type incumbents
rather than subsidizing entry or incumbent R&D directly (and this is the reason why the incumbent
R&D subsidy by itself was ine⁄ective).
We also show that these conclusions are robust to a range of variations. First, they are very
similar if we impose the elasticity of innovation to R&D from some of the micro estimates rather
than estimating it by simulated method of moments. Second, they are similar if we shut down
non-R&D productivity growth. Third, they are also fairly similar when we make the entry margin
much more inelastic, which would be the case, for example, if there were a ￿xed or limited supply
of potential entrants.
Overall, our policy analysis leads to a number of new results (relative to the literature and beliefs
and practices in policy circles). First, industrial policy (support to existing ￿rms and industries) is
damaging to growth and welfare, and at best ine⁄ective. Second, the equilibrium is ine¢ cient, but
in contrast to other models of endogenous innovation, this cannot be recti￿ed by R&D subsidies.
Third, the allocation of resources and growth can be signi￿cantly improved by exploiting the selec-
tion e⁄ect, which is only weakly utilized in equilibrium. This involves encouraging the reallocation
of R&D resources (skilled labor) from low-type incumbents to high-tech incumbents and entrants,
and if done e⁄ectively, it can increase growth and welfare by a signi￿cant amount.
Our paper is related to a number of di⁄erent literatures. First, it bridges the works focusing
on reallocation (e.g., Foster et al. 2000, 2006 and 2008) which take productivity growth and
innovation as exogenous and the parallel literature focusing on innovation (e.g., Romer 1990, Aghion
and Howitt 1992, Grossman and Helpman 1991, Jones 1995) that does not examine reallocation.
Second, it builds on the prior micro-to-macro innovation literature pioneered by Klette and Kortum
(2004) and Lentz and Mortensen (2008). We extend this work in a number of important ways, in
particular by introducing endogenous exit and time variation in the innovative capacity of ￿rms.
We also depart from all previous work in this area in terms of the questions we pose (in particular,
the impact of industrial policy on selection and innovation) and the detailed estimation of the
5model on microdata on innovation and reallocation. Finally, our paper is related to the literature
on the e⁄ects of industrial policies on innovation, R&D and growth. Goolsbee (1998), Romer (2001)
and Wilson (2009) suggest that R&D subsidies may mainly increase the wages of inelastic inputs
(such as R&D workers) rather than innovation, while Akcigit, Hanley and Serrano-Velarde (2012)
argue that R&D subsidies may be ine⁄ective when other complementary investments, such as basic
science, are not also subsidized. Our ￿ndings, instead, show that these policies tend to be ine⁄ective
when they fail￿ as they often do￿ to generate a positive selection across ￿rm types.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 describes
our data and quantitative framework. Section 4 presents our quanti￿ed parameter estimates, as-
sesses the model￿ s ￿t with the data, and provides validation tests. Section 5 examines the impact
of counterfactual policy experiments on the economy￿ s innovation and growth. Section 6 reports
the results from a number of robustness exercises. The last section concludes, while Appendix
A contains some of the proofs omitted from the text, and Appendix B, which is available online,
contains additional proofs and results.
2 Model
2.1 Preferences and Final Good Technology
Our economy is in continuous time and admits a representative household with the following CRRA
preferences
U0 =
Z 1
0
exp(￿￿t)
C (t)
1￿# ￿ 1
1 ￿ #
dt; (1)
where ￿ > 0 is the discount factor and C (t) is a consumption aggregate, with price normalized to
1 throughout without loss of generality. The consumption aggregate is given by
C (t) =
 Z
N(t)
cj (t)
"￿1
" dj
! "
"￿1
; (2)
where cj (t) is the consumption of product j at time t, " > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between
products, and N (t) ￿ [0;1] is the set of active product lines at time t. The reason why not all
products are active at each point in time will be made clear below.
We assume that the economy is closed, and because R&D and production costs are in terms of
labor, we have cj (t) = yj (t), where yj (t) is the amount of product j produced at time t. This also
implies that aggregate output (GDP) is equal to aggregate consumption, or
Y (t) = C (t):
There are two types of labor in the economy, skilled and unskilled. Unskilled workers are used
in the production of the active products (total labor demand denoted by LP), while skilled workers
perform R&D functions (total labor demand LRD) and are also employed to cover the (￿xed) costs
6of operations, such as management, back-o¢ ce functions and other non-production work (total
labor demand LF). In particular, we assume that the operation of each product, as well as the
operation of each potential entrant, requires ￿ > 0 units of skilled labor.
The representative household has a ￿xed skilled labor supply of measure LS and an unskilled
labor supply of measure 1, both supplied inelastically. The labor market clearing condition then
equates total labor demand to labor supply for each type of labor:
LP = 1 and LF + LRD = LS:
With this speci￿cation, the representative household maximizes its utility (1) subject to the
￿ ow budget constraint
_ A(t) + C (t) ￿ r(t)A(t) + wu (t) + LSws (t);
and the usual no-Ponzi condition, where A(t) =
R
N(t) Vj (t)dj is the asset position of the represen-
tative household, r(t) is the equilibrium interest rate on assets, and ws (t) and wu (t) denote skilled
and unskilled wages respectively. In what follows, we focus on stationary equilibria and drop the
time subscripts when this causes no confusion.
2.2 Intermediate Good Production
Intermediate good (product) j is produced by the monopolist who has the best (leading-edge)
technology in that product line, though a single monopolist can own multiple product lines and
can produce multiple intermediate goods simultaneously.
At any given point in time, there are two di⁄erent sets of ￿rms: (i) a set of active ￿rms F
which own at least one product line; and (ii) a set of potential entrants of measure m which do not
currently own any product line but invest in R&D for innovation.
Consider ￿rm f 2 F that has the leading-edge technology in product j. We assume that, once
it hires ￿ units of skilled labor for operation, this ￿rm has access to a linear technology in product
line j of the form
yf;j = qf;jlf;j; (3)
where qf;j is the leading-edge technology of ￿rm f in intermediate good j (which means that ￿rm
f has the best technology for this intermediate good), and lf;j is the number of workers it employs
for producing this good.
Let us denote by Jf the set of active product lines where ￿rm f has the leading-edge technology
and chooses to produce, and by nf the cardinality of this set, and also de￿ne
Qf ￿ fqf;j1;qf;j2;:::;qf;jng
as the set of productivities of ￿rm f in product lines in the set Jf. In what follows, we will drop
the f subscript when this causes no confusion; for example, we refer to qf;j as qj.
7With this notation, equation (3) implies that the marginal cost of production in line j is simply
wu=qj. Since all allocations will depend on the productivity of a product relative to the unskilled
wage, we de￿ne the relative productivity of a product with productivity q as
^ q ￿
q
wu:
We also de￿ne the productivity index of the economy as
Q ￿
￿Z
N
q"￿1
j dj
￿ 1
"￿1
. (4)
2.3 Firm Heterogeneity and Dynamics
Firms di⁄er in terms of their innovative capacities. Upon successful entry into the economy, each
￿rm draws its type ￿ 2
￿
￿H;￿L￿
, corresponding to one of two possible types high (H) and low (L).
We assume:
Pr
￿
￿ = ￿H￿
= ￿ and Pr
￿
￿ = ￿L￿
= 1 ￿ ￿;
where ￿ 2 (0;1) and ￿H > ￿L > 0. Firm type impacts innovation as described below. We assume
that while low-type is an absorbing state, high-type ￿rms transition to low-type at the exogenous
￿ ow rate ￿ > 0.
In addition to the transition from high to low type, each ￿rm is also subject to an exogenous
destructive shock at the rate ’. Once a ￿rm is hit by this shock, its value declines to zero and it
exits the economy.
Innovation by incumbents is modeled as follows. When ￿rm f with type ￿f hires hf workers
for developing a new product, it adds one more product into its portfolio at the ￿ ow rate
Xf = ￿
￿
fn
￿
fh
1￿￿
f ; (5)
where ￿ 2 (0;1) and nf is the number of product lines that ￿rm f owns in total. Suppressing the
f subscripts, this implies the following cost function for R&D
C (x;n;￿) = wsnx
1
1￿￿￿
￿
￿
1￿￿ ￿ wsnG(x;￿); (6)
where x ￿ X=n is the ￿innovation intensity￿ (innovation e⁄ort per product) and G(x;￿) ￿
x
1
1￿￿￿
￿
￿
1￿￿, de￿ned in (6), denotes the skilled labor requirement for a ￿rm with innovative ca-
pacity ￿ to generate a per product innovation rate of x.
We assume that research is undirected across product lines, meaning that ￿rms do not know ex
ante upon which particular product line they will innovate. This implies that their expected return
to R&D is the expected value across all product lines j 2 [0;1].
When a ￿rm innovates over an active product line j, it increases the productivity of this product
line j by qj￿. That is,
qj (t+) = (1 + ￿)qj (t);
8where t+ refers to the instant after time t, and ￿ > 0 is the proportional incremental improvement
in technology due to innovation. If the ￿rm innovates over an inactive product line, it draws a new
relative productivity from the (stationary) equilibrium distribution F (^ q).
In addition to productivity growth driven by R&D, we also allow for non-R&D activity growth
both to capture the fact that ￿rms generate productivity growth for reasons unrelated to their
research expenditures and to allow for the possibility that there are potential advantages for in-
cumbents (e.g., due to their size) even if they do not perform R&D. We model this in the following
tractable manner: each active ￿rm receives a positive innovation shock at the rate % per (active)
product line, and following this, it adds one of the inactive product lines into its portfolio (crucially,
the likelihood of this innovation is independent of R&D e⁄ort). The productivity of the product
lines is determined through a new draw from F (^ q):
2.4 Entry and Exit
There is a large supply of potential entrants. In equilibrium, a measure m of those will be active.
To do so, an entrant needs to hire ￿ units of skilled labor and has access to an R&D technology
G
￿
xentry;￿E￿
, where the function G was de￿ned in (6) above and speci￿es the number of skilled
workers necessary for generating an innovation rate of xentry. This speci￿cation implies that a
potential entrant has access to an R&D technology that an incumbent with innovative capacity
￿E and a single active product would have had. Summarizing, an entrant wishing to achieve an
innovation rate of xentry would need to hire
hentry = ￿ + G
￿
xentry;￿E￿
(7)
skilled workers.
Upon entry, ￿rms draw their incumbent type ￿ 2
￿
￿H;￿L￿
and the productivity of the product
they will produce as speci￿ed above.
This description implies the following free-entry condition:
max
xentry￿0
￿
￿ws￿ + xentryEV entry (^ q;￿) ￿ wsG
￿
xentry;￿E￿￿
= 0; (8)
where EV entry (:) is the expected value of entry (and the expectation is over the relative productivity
^ q of the single product the successful entrants will obtain and ￿rm type ￿ 2
￿
￿H;￿L￿
which will
be realized upon successful entry). The maximization in (8) determines the R&D intensity of an
entrant, conditional on paying the ￿xed cost of operations (in terms of ￿ units of skilled labor). So
long as the maximized value of this expression is positive, there will be further entry, and if it is
negative, there will be less entry. Thus in equilibrium, the number (measure) of entrants, m, has
to adjust so as to set this maximized value to zero.5 Given the resulting number of entrants, the
total entry rate is Xentry ￿ mxentry:
5This is unless we are at a corner with m = 0. For this reason, (8) should have been in complementary slackness
form, but since our focus is always on an equilibrium with positive growth and entry, we have written it as an equality.
9Exit (of products and ￿rms) has three causes:
1. Creative destruction, which will result from innovation by other ￿rms replacing the leading-
edge technology in a particular product line.
2. Exogenous destructive shock at the rate ’ > 0.
3. Obsolescence, which will result from the endogenous exit of ￿rms from product lines that are
no longer su¢ ciently pro￿table relative to the ￿xed cost of operation.
Due to the second and third factors, the measure of inactive product lines, ￿np, will be positive.
2.5 Value Functions
We normalize all the growing variables by Q(t) to keep the stationary equilibrium values constant.
Let us denote the normalized value of a generic variable X by ~ X. Let ￿ denote the average creative
destruction rate which is endogenously determined in the economy: Then the stationary equilibrium
value function for a low-type ￿rm can be written as
r~ Vl
￿
^ Q
￿
= max
8
> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :
0;max
x
2
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
4
X
^ q2 ^ Q
"
~ ￿ (^ q) ￿ ~ ws￿+
￿
h
~ Vl
￿
^ Qnf^ qg
￿
￿ ~ Vl
￿
^ Q
￿i
+
@ ~ Vl( ^ Q)
@^ q
@^ q
@wu
@wu
@t
#
￿n ~ wsG
￿
x;￿L￿
+nx
h
E~ Vl
￿
^ Q [ f^ q (1 + ￿)g
￿
￿ ~ Vl
￿
^ Q
￿i
+n%
h
E~ Vl
￿
^ Q [ f^ qg
￿
￿ ~ Vl
￿
^ Q
￿i
+’
h
0 ￿ ~ Vl
￿
^ Q
￿i
3
7 7
7 7
7 7
7 7
7 7
5
9
> > > > > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > > > > ;
; (9)
where ^ Q [
￿
^ qj0
￿
denotes the new portfolio of the ￿rm after successfully innovating in product line
j0: Similarly ^ Qnf^ qjg denotes the loss of a product with technology ^ qj from ￿rm f￿ s portfolio ^ Q due
to creative destruction.
The value function (9) can be interpreted as follows. Given discounting at the rate r, the left-
hand side is the ￿ ow value of a low-type ￿rm with a set of product lines given by ^ Q. The right-hand
side includes the components that make up this ￿ ow value. The ￿rst line (inside the summation)
includes the instantaneous operating pro￿ts, minus the ￿xed costs of operation, plus the change
in ￿rm value if any of its products gets replaced by another ￿rm through creative destruction at
the rate ￿; plus the change in ￿rm value due to the the increase in the economy-wide wage. This
last term accounts for the fact that as the wage rate increases, the relative productivity of each of
the products that the ￿rm operates declines. The second line subtracts the R&D expenditure by
￿rm f: The third line expresses the change in ￿rm value when the low-type ￿rm is successful with
its R&D investment at the rate x: The fourth line indicates the change in value when a positive
innovation shock arrives at the rate %. The last line shows the change in value when the ￿rm has
to exit due to an exogenous destructive shock at the rate ’.
10Similarly, we can write the value function of a high-type ￿rm,
r~ Vh
￿
^ Q
￿
= max
8
> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :
0;max
x
2
6
6 6
6 6
6
6 6
6 6
4
X
^ q2 ^ Q
"
~ ￿ (^ q) ￿ ~ ws￿+
￿
h
~ Vh
￿
^ Qnf^ qg
￿
￿ ~ Vh
￿
^ Q
￿i
+
@ ~ Vh( ^ Q)
@^ q
@^ q
@wu
@wu
@t
#
￿n ~ wsG
￿
x;￿H￿
+nx
h
E~ Vh
￿
^ Q [ f^ q (1 + ￿)g
￿
￿ ~ Vh
￿
^ Q
￿i
+n%
h
E~ Vh
￿
^ Q [ f^ qg
￿
￿ ~ Vh
￿
^ Q
￿i
+’
h
0 ￿ ~ Vh
￿
^ Q
￿i
+ ￿
h
I ^ Q> ^ Ql;min ￿ ~ Vl
￿
^ Q
￿
￿ ~ Vh
￿
^ Q
￿i
3
7
7 7
7 7
7 7
7 7
7
5
9
> > > > > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > > > > ;
: (10)
The major di⁄erence from (9) is in the last line, where we incorporate the possibility of a transition
to a low-type status at the rate ￿. The remaining terms have the same interpretation as (9):
The next lemma shows that the value of each ￿rm can be expressed as the sum of the franchise
values of each of their product lines, de￿ned as the net present discounted value of pro￿ts from a
product line (as we will see these franchise values depend on the type of the ￿rm). This decompo-
sition enables us to derive an expression for the value functions in terms of a di⁄erential equation
for the franchise value of each product line.
Lemma 1 The value function of a k 2 fh;lg type ￿rm takes an additive form
~ Vk
￿
^ Q
￿
=
X
^ q2^ q
￿k (^ q);
where ￿k (^ q) is the franchise value of a product line of relative productivity ^ q to a ￿rm of type k.
Moreover, ￿k (^ q) is strictly increasing and ￿rms follow a cuto⁄ rule for their obsolescence decision
such that
￿k (^ q)
8
<
:
= 1 if ^ q > ^ qk;min
= 0 if ^ q < ^ qk;min
2 [0;1] otherwise
:
Proof. See the Appendix.
2.6 Equilibrium
The household￿ s intertemporal choice delivers the following standard Euler equation
_ C
C
=
r ￿ ￿
#
: (11)
Next we turn to the intermediate good producers￿problem. The speci￿cation in (2) generates the
following demand for product j
pj = C
1
"c
￿ 1
"
j ; 8j 2 [0;1]:
Then the monopolist ￿rm f solves the following pro￿t maximization for product line j
￿ (qj) = max
cj
￿￿
C
1
"c
￿ 1
"
j ￿ ^ q￿1
j
￿
cj
￿
;
11which delivers the price and demand for intermediate good j as
pj =
"
(" ￿ 1) ^ qj
and cj =
￿
" ￿ 1
"
^ qj
￿"
C: (12)
Therefore the equilibrium pro￿ts are
￿ (^ qj) =
^ q"￿1
j
" ￿ 1
￿
" ￿ 1
"
￿"
C:
Utility maximization by consumers yields
1 =
￿Z
N
p1￿"
j dj
￿ 1
1￿"
:
Substituting cj from (12) into the production function (2); the unskilled wage rate is
wu =
" ￿ 1
"
Q; (13)
where Q is given in (4).
The next lemma characterizes the franchise value of a single product line as the solution to a
simple di⁄erential equation (the solution to which is provided in Proposition 1) and the type of the
￿rm with the best technology in this product line.
Lemma 2 The franchise values of owning a product line of relative productivity ^ q by low-type and
high-type ￿rms, respectively, are given the following di⁄erential equations
(r + ￿ + ’)￿l (^ q) ￿
@￿l (^ q)
@^ q
@^ q
@wu
@wu
@t
=
n
￿^ q"￿1 ￿ ~ ws￿ + ￿l
o
if ^ q > ^ ql;min (14)
￿l (^ q) = 0 otherwise
and
(r + ￿ + ’)￿h (^ q) ￿
@￿h (^ q)
@^ q
@^ q
@wu
@wu
@t
=
￿
￿^ q"￿1 ￿ ~ ws￿ + ￿h+
￿
￿
I^ q>^ ql;min ￿ ￿l (^ q) ￿ ￿h (^ q)
￿
￿
if ^ q > ^ qh;min
￿h (^ q) = 0 otherwise
where ￿ ￿ 1
"￿1
￿"￿1
"
￿" ; and
￿k ￿ max
x
￿
￿ ~ wsG
￿
x;￿k￿
+ xE￿k (^ q (1 + ￿))
+%E￿k (^ q)
￿
; for k 2 fL;Hg
is the option value of a k-type ￿rm. Moreover, the R&D policy function of a k-type ￿rm is
xk = ￿k
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)E￿k (^ q (1 + ￿))
~ ws
￿1￿￿
￿
for k 2 fL;Hg: (15)
Finally, ^ qk;min is given by
^ qk;min =
￿
~ ws￿ ￿ ￿k
￿
￿ 1
"￿1
for k 2 fL;Hg: (16)
12Proof. This follows from the proof of Lemma 1.
Intuitively, the franchise value of a ￿rm with relative productivity ^ q can be solved out explicitly
for the following reasons. First, so long as this product line remains active, the ￿rm receives
two returns: a ￿ ow of pro￿ts depending on ^ q, ￿^ q"￿1, and the option value, denoted by ￿k for a
￿rm of type k. The option value includes an R&D component since the ￿rm can undertake R&D
building on the knowledge embedded in this active product line, and it also includes a non-R&D
component since incumbents stochastically acquire new product lines without R&D investment.
While operating this product line, the ￿rm also incurs the ￿xed cost of operation ~ ws￿. Second,
the relative productivity of this product line is declining proportionately at the growth rate of the
economy, g, reducing pro￿ts at the rate (" ￿ 1)g. Third, this product line is replaced by a higher
productivity one at the rate ￿ and the ￿rm exits for endogenous reasons at the rate ’, making
the e⁄ective discount rate r + ￿ + ’. Fourth, if this product line is not replaced or the ￿rm does
not exit by the time its relative productivity reaches ^ qk;min (for a ￿rm of type k), it will be made
obsolete, providing a boundary condition for the di⁄erential equation. Finally, for high-type ￿rms
there is an additional term incorporating the possibility of switching to low-type.
The next proposition provides the solution to these di⁄erential equations.
Proposition 1 Let g and ~ ws be the stationary equilibrium growth rate of the economy and the
normalized skilled wage rate, respectively. Moreover, let
zk (x) ￿
￿
1 ￿
￿
^ qk;min
^ q
￿x￿
:
Then, the franchise value of a product line value with relative productivity ^ q for a low-type ￿rm is
￿l (^ q) =
￿^ q"￿1
￿ + (" ￿ 1)g
zl
￿
￿ + (" ￿ 1)g
g
￿
+
￿l ￿ ~ ws￿
￿
zl
￿
￿
g
￿
;
where ￿ ￿ 1
"￿1
￿"￿1
"
￿" and ￿ ￿ r + ￿ + ’: Similarly, the franchise value of a product line with
relative productivity ^ q for a high-type ￿rm is
￿h (^ q) =
8
> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
￿^ q"￿1
￿+￿+("￿1)gzh
￿
￿+￿+("￿1)g
g
￿
￿
~ w￿￿￿h
￿+￿ zh
￿
￿+￿
g
￿
; for ^ q 2 [^ qh;min; ^ ql;min]
8
> > > <
> > > :
￿^ q"￿1
￿+￿+g("￿1)zh
￿
￿+￿+("￿1)g
g
￿
+
￿h￿ ~ w￿
￿+￿ zh
￿
￿+￿
g
￿
￿^ q"￿1
￿+("￿1)gzl
￿
￿+("￿1)g
g
￿
+
￿l￿ ~ ws￿
￿ zl
￿
￿
g
￿
￿
￿^ q"￿1
￿+￿+g("￿1)zl
￿
￿+￿+("￿1)g
g
￿
￿
￿l￿ ~ ws￿
￿+￿ zl
￿
￿+￿
g
￿
9
> > > =
> > > ;
; for ^ q ￿ ^ ql;min
Proof. See the Appendix.
2.7 Labor Market and Stationary Equilibrium Distributions
The normalized productivity distribution for type-k ￿rms has a stationary equilibrium distribution
function, Fk (^ q) on [^ qk;min;1): Let the shares of product lines that belong to two di⁄erent types of
13￿rms and inactive product lines be denoted by ￿h, ￿l and ￿np, respectively. Naturally,
￿h + ￿l + ￿np = 1:
Then the labor market clearing condition for unskilled workers is
Z
N
l(^ qj)dj =
￿
" ￿ 1
"
1
wu
￿"
C
Z
N
q"￿1
j dj = 1: (17)
Using (4), (12) and (13); the previous labor market condition gives
Y = C = Q: (18)
The labor market clearing for skilled workers, on the other hand, sets the total demand made
up of demand from entrants (￿rst term) and demand from incumbents (second term) equal to the
total supply, LS:
m
￿
￿ + G
￿
xentry;￿E￿￿
+
Z
N
0
@
X
k2fh;lg
￿k [hk (ws) + ￿]
1
A = LS: (19)
To solve for the labor market clearing condition, we need to characterize the measures of active
product lines ￿k and the stationary equilibrium productivity distributions conditional on ￿rm type.
This is done in the next three equations and the next lemma. In each equation, the left-hand side
expresses the in￿ ows into product lines of type h, l or np (which are, respectively, controlled by
high-type and low-type ￿rms and inactive) and the right-side expresses the out￿ ows:
￿
Xentry￿ + ￿hxh
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿h
￿
+ %￿h =
￿
￿h ￿
￿ + ’ + Xentry (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿lxl￿
+￿h^ qh;mingfh (^ qh;min)
￿
(20)
￿ ￿
Xentry (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿lxl￿￿
1 ￿ ￿l￿
+￿h￿ [1 ￿ Fh (^ ql;min)] + %￿l
￿
= ￿l
￿
’ + Xentry￿ + ￿hxh
￿
+ ￿l^ ql;mingfl (^ ql;min) (21)
￿
’(1 ￿ ￿np) + ￿h^ qh;mingfh (^ qh;min)
+￿l^ ql;mingfl (^ ql;min) + ￿h￿Fh (^ ql;min)
￿
= %(1 ￿ ￿np) + ￿np
￿
Xentry + ￿hxh + ￿lxl
￿
(22)
We next express the ￿ ow equations that determine the stationary equilibrium productivity dis-
tributions for the high-type and low-type product lines (which are di⁄erent but jointly determined).
These distributions ensure that the ￿ ows into and out of any interval of productivity are equalized,
so that in the stationary equilibrium, these distributions remain invariant.
Lemma 3 The stationary equilibrium (invariant) productivity distributions of active product lines
of low-type and high-type ￿rms satisfy the following equations:
g^ qfl (^ q) =
8
> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
2
6
4
g^ ql;minfl (^ ql;min) + (￿ + ’)[Fl (^ q) ￿ Fl (^ ql;min)]
￿
￿
￿lxl+(1￿￿)Xentry
￿l
￿￿
￿hFh
￿
^ q
1+￿
￿
+ ￿lFl
￿
^ q
1+￿
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)F (^ q)
￿
￿￿ ￿h
￿l [Fh (^ q) ￿ Fh (^ ql;min)]
3
7
5 for ^ ql;crit < ^ q
"
g^ ql;minfl (^ ql;min) + (￿ + ’)[Fl (^ q) ￿ Fl (^ ql;min)]
￿￿ ￿h
￿l [Fh (^ q) ￿ Fh (^ ql;min)]
#
for ^ ql;min < ^ q ￿ ^ ql;crit
(23)
14and
g^ qfh (^ q) =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
2
6
4
g^ qh;minfh (^ qh;min) + (￿ + ’ + ￿)[Fh (^ q) ￿ Fh (^ qh;min)]
￿
￿
￿hxh+￿Xentry
￿h
￿
 
￿hFh
￿
^ q
1+￿
￿
+ ￿lFl
￿
^ q
1+￿
￿
+(1 ￿ ￿)F (^ q)
!
3
7
5 for ^ qh;crit < ^ q
g^ qh;minfh (^ qh;min) + (￿ + ’ + ￿)[Fh (^ q) ￿ Fh (^ qh;min)] for ^ qh;min < ^ q ￿ ^ qh;crit
(24)
where ￿ ￿ ￿h + ￿l is the measure of active product lines.
Proof. See the Appendix.
2.8 Aggregate Growth
Equation (18) shows that aggregate output is equal to the productivity index, Q. Thus the growth
rate of aggregate output is given by g = _ Q=Q. Let us also denote the type-speci￿c productivity
indices by ~ Qk
t =
R
Ns
t q"￿1
jt dj where k 2 fl;hg, the ratio of productivity index of low-type to that
of high-type active product lines by ￿ ￿
~ Qh
~ Ql ; and the ratio of the productivity index of inactive
product lines to k-type productivity index by {k ￿
￿npEFq"￿1
t
~ Qk
t
(where k 2 fl;hg). Then:
Proposition 2 The growth rate of the economy is then equal to
g =
￿
xh + ￿Xentry￿h
(1 + ￿)
"￿1 ￿
1 + 1
￿
￿
+ {h
i
+ %￿h{h ￿ [￿ + ￿ + ’]
" ￿ 1 + ^ qh;minfh (^ qh;min)
; (25)
and ￿ is the solution to:
( ￿
xh + ￿Xentry￿h
(1 + ￿)
"￿1 ￿
1 + 1
￿
￿
+ {h
i
+%{h
￿
￿h ￿ ￿l￿
￿
)
=
8
> <
> :
￿
xl + (1 ￿ ￿)Xentry￿h
(1 + ￿)
"￿1 (1 + ￿) + {l
i
+￿ [1 + [1 ￿ Fh (^ ql;min)]￿]
+g [^ qh;minfh (^ qh;min) ￿ ^ ql;minfl (^ ql;min)]
9
> =
> ;
:
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition for the growth rate in (25) is as follows. The numerator has the contribution of
entrants and di⁄erent types of incumbent ￿rms to the productivity distribution, and the denom-
inator adjusts for the improvements in productivity distribution due to obsolescence. Note that
the growth rate expression is written for high-type ￿rms. There exists an equivalent expression for
low-type ￿rms￿ the equivalence follows since in a balanced growth path, the productivity index of
high-type ￿rms
￿
~ Qh
￿
and low-type ￿rms
￿
~ Ql
￿
must grow at the same rate. This is ensured by the
adjustment of productivity ratio ￿:
Finally we summarize the equilibrium of this economy.
De￿nition 1 (Stationary Equilibrium) A stationary equilibrium of this economy is a tuple
fyj;pj;lj; ~ Vl; ~ Vh; ^ qh;min; ^ ql;min;xh;xl;xentry;hh;hl;hentry;m;￿h;￿l;￿np;Fl (^ q);Fh (^ q);ws;wu;g;rg
15such that [i] yj and pj maximize pro￿ts as in (12) and the labor demand lj satis￿es (3); [ii] ~ Vl and
~ Vh are given by the low-type and high-type value functions in (9) and (10); [iii] (^ qh;min; ^ ql;min) satisfy
the cuto⁄ rule in (16); [iv] xh and xl are given by the R&D policy functions in (15) and xentry and
m satisfy the free-entry condition in (8); [v] the skilled worker demands hh, hl and hentry satisfy (5)
and (7); [vi] the product line shares
￿
￿h;￿l;￿np￿
satisfy (20)￿(22); [vii] the stationary equilibrium
productivity distributions (Fl (^ q);Fh (^ q)) satisfy (23) and (24); [viii] the growth rate is given by (25);
[ix] the interest rate satis￿es the Euler equation (11); and [x] ws and wu are consistent with labor
market clearing for unskilled and skilled workers as given by (17) and (19):
Though the stationary equilibrium in this model is a relatively complex object, as we have seen
the values for di⁄erent types of ￿rms can be computed in closed form given the equilibrium wage.
There are no closed-form solutions for the equilibrium wage rate and stationary distributions, but
these can be computed numerically. We will also use this computation for the simulated method
of moments estimation as outlined in Section 3.2.
2.9 Welfare
Recall that output and consumption are equal to the productivity index Q, so that at the initial
date we have C0 = Q0. The endogenous initial productivity index can be expressed as
Q0 ￿
￿Z
N
q"￿1
j0 dj
￿ 1
"￿1
= (￿ q0￿)
1
"￿1 ;
where ￿ q0 denotes the initial average productivity level (speci￿ed as the initial condition), and
￿ ￿ ￿h + ￿l is the endogenous measure of active product lines. Welfare in the economy depends
on this initial productivity index Q0 and hence on ￿ q0 and ￿. In the rest of the paper, we normalize
the average initial productivity level of all active products lines to 1, i.e., ￿ q0 = 1, which thus gives
us C0 = Q0 = ￿
1
"￿1. Then welfare can be obtained as
U0 (C0;g) =
Z 1
0
exp(￿￿t)
C1￿#
t ￿ 1
1 ￿ #
dt
=
1
1 ￿ #
Z 1
0
h
C
(1￿#)
0 e￿￿te(1￿#)gt ￿ e￿￿t
i
dt
=
1
1 ￿ #
"
￿
1￿#
"￿1
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ #)g
￿
1
￿
#
; (26)
where the ￿rst line simply repeats the de￿nition of discounted utility from (1), the second line uses
the assumption that we are in stationary equilibrium (thus implying that we are not evaluating
welfare implications of transitioning from one stationary equilibrium to another), and the third line
solves the integral and uses C0 = ￿
1
"￿1.
In comparing welfare in two economies, say with subsidy policies s1 and s2, and resulting growth
rates g (s1) and g (s2) and initial consumption levels C0 (s1) and C0 (s2), we compute consumption
16equivalent changes in welfare by considering the fraction of initial consumption $ that will ensure
the same discounted utility with the new growth rate as with the initial allocation. More formally,
￿ is given such that
U0 (￿C0 (s2);g (s2)) = U0 (C0 (s1);g (s1)):
Note also that the decentralized allocation in this model does not maximize welfare or growth
for a variety of reasons. Nevertheless, monopoly markups, in and of themselves, are not a source of
ine¢ ciency because they are the same for all products. In models with endogenous technological
change, there is typically insu¢ cient R&D because ￿rms do not appropriate the full value of new
innovations (see, e.g., Acemoglu 2008, for a discussion). This channel is also potentially present
in the current model and this is the ￿rst reason for divergence between the equilibrium and the
e¢ cient allocation. In particular, it a⁄ects the allocation of skilled workers between R&D and
operations because ￿rms ignore two indirect bene￿ts of innovation: a higher productivity product
increases the productivity of ￿rms that innovate over it, and improvements over non-active product
lines also bene￿t from innovation because these build on the existing knowledge stock.6 The second
reason for the ine¢ ciency of equilibrium is that low productivity ￿rms, especially low productivity
low-type ￿rms, remain active too long relative to what the welfare-maximizing social planner would
choose. This is because the social planner would take into account that by freeing resources from
the ￿xed cost of operations for these ￿rms, she can increase R&D, which is not fully internalized
by the market because the skilled wage is depressed relative to its social value. These e⁄ects imply
that policies that increase R&D and those that shift the composition of ￿rms towards high-type
￿rms will typically increase welfare and growth.
3 Estimation and Quantitative Analysis
To perform the policy experiments described in the Introduction, we ￿rst estimate the parameters
of our model using simulated method of moments (SMM). In this section, we describe our data set
and estimation procedures, and the next two sections provide our results and policy counterfactual
experiments.
3.1 Data
We employ the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD), the Census of Manufacturers (CMF), the
NSF Survey of Industrial Research and Development (RAD), and the NBER Patent Database
(PAT). The LBD and CMF are the backbone for our study. The LBD is a business registry that
contains annual employment levels for every private-sector establishment in the US with payroll
from 1976 onward. The CMF is conducted every ￿ve years and provides detailed records on
manufacturing plant and ￿rm operations (e.g., output). Sourced from US tax records and Census
6Counteracting this, ￿rms also fail to take into account the gains to consumers from increasing the range of active
product lines.
17Bureau surveys, these micro-records document the universe of establishments and ￿rms, making
them an unparalleled laboratory for studying our model of reallocation, entry/exit, and related
￿rm dynamics.
The Survey of Industrial Research and Development (RAD) is the US government￿ s primary
instrument for surveying the R&D expenditures and innovative e⁄orts of US ￿rms. This is an
annual or biannual survey conducted jointly by the Census Bureau and NSF. The survey includes
with certainty all public and private ￿rms, as well as foreign-owned ￿rms, undertaking over one
million dollars of R&D within the US. The survey frame also sub-samples ￿rms conducting less
than the certainty expenditure threshold. The certainty threshold was raised after 1996 to ￿ve
million dollars of R&D for future years (before subsequently being lowered after our sample frame).
RAD surveys are linked to the LBD￿ s and CMF￿ s operating data through Census Bureau identi￿ers.
These micro-records begin in 1972 and provide the most detailed statistics available on ￿rm-level
R&D e⁄orts. In 1997, 3,741 ￿rms reported positive R&D expenditures that sum to $158 billion.
Foster and Grim (2010) provide additional details.
To complement the RAD, we also match patent data into the Census Bureau data. We employ
the individual records of all patents granted by the United States Patent and Trademark O¢ ce
(USPTO) from January 1975 to May 2009. Each patent record provides information about the
invention and the inventors submitting the application. Hall et al. (2001) provide extensive details
about these data, and Griliches (1990) surveys the use of patents as economic indicators of technol-
ogy advancement. We only employ patents (i) ￿led by inventors living in the US at the time of the
patent application; and (ii) assigned to industrial ￿rms. In 1997, this group comprised about 77
thousand patents. We match these patent data to the LBD using ￿rm name and location matching
algorithms.7
Our sample focuses on ￿continuously innovative￿￿rms. We de￿ne a ￿rm as ￿innovative￿if it is
conducting R&D or patenting within the US. Our operating data come from the years 1987, 1992,
and 1997 when the CMF is conducted, and the data are speci￿c to those years. We develop our
measures of innovation using ￿ve-year windows surrounding these CMF years (e.g., 1985-1989 for
the 1987 CMF). These local averages assist with RAD￿ s biannual reporting when it occurs, and
they ensure that we include two RAD surveys with the lower certainty threshold for the 1997 CMF
group. The local averages also provide a more consistent measure of patent ￿lings, which can be
lumpy for ￿rms with few patents. We describe the use of patents in further detail shortly.
The ￿continuous￿part of our sample selection is important and is structured as follows. We only
include a ￿rm in our sample if it conducts R&D or patents during the ￿ve-year window surrounding
each CMF year in which it is operating (i.e., has positive employment and sales in the CMF). Thus,
a ￿rm that is in operation in 1987 and 1992 is included in our sample if it is also conducting R&D
or patents during 1985-1989 and 1990-1994. Similarly, a ￿rm that is in operation in 1992 and 1997
7Akcigit and Kerr (2010) discuss the R&D and patent data in much greater detail. The patent matching builds
upon the prior work of Balasubramanian and Sivadasan (2011) and Kerr and Fu (2008). See also Kogan et al (2012).
18is included in our sample if it is also conducting R&D or patents during 1990-1994 and 1995-1999.
The ￿rm does not need to conduct R&D or patent in every year of the ￿ve-year window, but must
do one of the two activities at least once.
This selection process has several features to point out. First, the entrants in our sample (i.e.,
￿rms ￿rst appearing in the 1992 or 1997 CMF) will be innovative throughout their lifecycle until
the 1995-1999 period. Second, we do not consider switches into innovation among already existing
￿rms. For example, we exclude ￿rms that are present in the 1987 and 1992 CMF, patent or
conduct R&D in the 1990-1994 period, but do not patent or conduct R&D during 1985-1989 (the
probability that an existing, non-innovative ￿rm commences R&D or patenting over the ensuing
￿ve years, conditional on survival, is only about 1%). Third, and on a similar note, we do not
include in our sample ￿rms that cease to be innovative but continue in operation. Exits in our
economy will be de￿ned over ￿rms that patent or conduct R&D until they cease to operate.
Finally, our sample does not condition on innovative activity before 1985-1989. Thus, the
incumbents in our sample who were in operation prior to the 1987 CMF may have had some point
in their past when they did not conduct R&D or patent. We only require that incumbents be
innovative in every period when they are in operation during our sample. This choice allows us to
construct a full distribution of innovative ￿rms in the economy, which is important when considering
the reallocation of resources for innovation. Of course, this choice is also partly due to necessity
as we do not observe the full history of older incumbents. We discuss further below the aggregate
implications for reallocation and growth measurement of this design.8
We now describe the use of the patenting data. In accordance with our model, the moments
below focus on R&D intensities (i.e., inputs into the innovation production function). We face
the challenge that the RAD sub-samples ￿rms conducting less than one million dollars in R&D.
By contrast, the patent data are universally observed. To provide a more complete distribution,
we use patents to impute R&D values for ￿rms that are less than the certainty threshold and
not sub-sampled. Thus, our moments combine the R&D and patent data into a single measure
that accords with the model. As the R&D expenditures in these sub-sampled cases are very
low (by de￿nition), this imputation choice versus treating unsurveyed R&D expenditures as zero
expenditures conditional on patenting is not very important.
Overall, our compiled dataset includes innovative manufacturing ￿rms from the years 1987,
1992, and 1997 when the CMF is conducted. A record in our dataset is a ￿rm-year observation that
aggregates over the ￿rm￿ s manufacturing establishments. We have 17,055 observations from 9,835
￿rms. By abstracting from the extensive margin of entry or exit into innovation for continuing
￿rms, all of our moments are consistently de￿ned and well measured in the data. At the same
time, our selection procedures provide as complete a distribution of innovative ￿rms as possible,
8Note that it would have been impossible to build a consistent sample for ￿ever innovative￿ ￿rms rather than
for continuously innovative ￿rms. To see why, consider keeping all of the past records for ￿rms that conduct R&D
in 1997. In both 1987 and 1992, this approach would induce a mismeasurement of exit propensities and growth
dynamics because a portion of the sample will include ￿rms conditioned on survival until 1997.
19which is important when considering reallocation. Our sample accounts for 98% of industrial R&D
conducted during the period. When compared to a single cross-section of data, our sample is slightly
more skewed towards larger ￿rms. Speci￿cally, in the average year during our sample period, 22%
of the ￿rms conducting R&D or patenting have more than 500 employees. In our sample, 31.5% of
observations have more than 500 employees.
Our sample focuses on the reallocation of resources for innovation and thus excludes ￿rms that
do not report R&D or patents, which we de￿ne as ￿non-innovative ￿rms￿ . It is important to place
our sample within the overall distribution of economic activity. When including non-innovative
￿rms, our sample accounts for 2.1% of ￿rms, 2.0% of ￿rms with fewer than 5000 employees, 48% of
employment, and 65% of sales within manufacturing. The greater share of employment and sales
activity than ￿rm counts is because the great majority of small ￿rms are non-innovative. In a
similar manner and due to the link of innovation to growth, our sample accounts for a substantial
portion of reallocation occurring. Many small ￿rms are not oriented for growth (e.g., Haltiwanger
et al., 2013) and thus play a limited role in reallocation. As one statistic, our sample includes
58% and 65% of employment and sales reallocation, respectively, among continuing manufacturing
￿rms between 1987 and 1997. As a second statistic, among ￿rms that were either very small (fewer
than 20 employees) or did not exist in 1987, we capture 94% of those that then grew to 10,000+
employees by 1997. We likewise capture 80% of small ￿rms or new entrants that grow to one billion
dollars in sales by 1997.
Our central moments are ￿rm entry/exit rates, the age and size distribution of ￿rms, transitions
across the ￿rm size distribution over time, ￿rm growth rates by age and size, ￿rm innovation
intensity by age and size, and entrants￿share of employment in the economy.9 Size distributions
use the median employment in each CMF year to distinguish small and large ￿rms. The age
distribution is similarly separated into whether a ￿rm is 0-9 years or 10+ years old. We assign
initial ages through when the ￿rm is ￿rst observed in the LBD with positive employment. We
de￿ne moments related to entry/exit, growth, and age-size distribution transitions as changes
between CMF years expressed in per annum terms.10 Shipments are de￿ ated using the 2009 NBER
Productivity Database.11
9Firm age is de￿ned from the birth year of the initial establishment of the ￿rm.
10We measure growth rates relative to base years over the ￿ve-year period to allow a direct decomposition to per
annum terms. These growth rates are winsorized at their 10% and 90% values. The patterns are similar when
expressing growth relative to the average of base and end years. We then calculate geometric averages over these
￿rm-level growth rates. We winsorize R&D intensities at their 99.8% value to be conservative (approximately a 10:1
R&D to sales ratio).
11Prices in industries related to computers and semiconductors behave di⁄erently from those in other parts of
manufacturing. We ￿nd very similar moments when excluding these industries from our moment calculations.
203.2 Computational Algorithm
The model can be solved computationally as a ￿xed point of the following vector of eight aggregate
equilibrium variables
n
~ ws;g;￿h;￿l;E[￿h(^ q)];E[￿l(^ q)];E[￿h((1 + ￿)^ q)];E[￿l((1 + ￿)^ q)]
o
: (27)
Our characterization above shows that equilibrium innovation decisions can be determined given
these aggregate variables. While the skilled wage ~ ws determines the cost of innovation, the rest of
the variables in (27) determine the expected return to innovation. We can solve for the stationary
equilibrium by ￿rst posing a conjecture for (27), then solving for the individual innovation decisions
and then verifying the initial conjecture. Speci￿cally, using the guess for these variables:
1. we compute the innovation intensities xh and xl and option values ￿h and ￿l, and calculate
the functions ￿h(^ q) and ￿l(^ q) according to Lemma 2;
2. using the innovation intensities, we calculate the stationary equilibrium distribution over
active/inactive product lines and over values of ^ q for those that are active using the ￿ ow equations
(20) ￿ (24);
3. we check the labor market clearing conditions using the innovation intensities and the above
distributions and compute the equilibrium wage rates from (17) and (19), updating ~ ws;
4. we update the values for g;E[￿h(￿^ q)];E[￿l(￿^ q)];E[￿h(^ q)]; and E[￿l(^ q)].
The above system of equations is solved using a Powell hybrid non-linear equation solver.12
This procedure gives us (27) as a ￿xed point and also the stationary equilibrium distributions
for Fh (^ q) and Fl (^ q): Note that all these variables are determined at the product-line level. We
compute ￿rm-level moments by simulating the evolution of a panel of 214 ￿rms until they reach
approximate stationary equilibrium after 10,000 periods. Each period corresponds to 0.02 of a year
hence the total simulation time comes out to 200 years. At each iteration, ￿rms gain and lose
products according to the ￿ ow probabilities speci￿ed in the model.
3.3 Estimation
We set the discount rate equal to ￿ = 2%, which roughly corresponds to an annual discount factor
of 97%, and the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution to # = 2. The remaining 12
parameters, which are listed in Table 1, are estimated with SMM.13 We compute the model-implied
moments from the simulation strategy described above and compare them to the data-generated
moments to minimize
min
21 X
i=1
jmodel(i) ￿ data(i)j
1
2 jmodel(i)j + 1
2 jdata(i)j
;
12For computational reasons, in the intermediate steps where ￿rms draw from the stationary equilibrium relative
productivity distribution, we use the best ￿tting exponential distribution to the distributions derived in the previous
iteration.
13See McFadden (1989) and Pakes and Pollard (1989) for the statistical properties of the SMM estimator.
21where we index each moment by i: SMM iteratively searches repeatedly across sets of parameter
values in the model until the model￿ s moments are as close as possible to the empirical moments.
Our SMM procedure targets the 21 moments outlined in Table 2, focusing on ￿rm entry, exit,
employment and sales growth, and innovation intensity, selected in each case because of their
economic importance for the mechanisms of the model. We have a single aggregate moment, the
aggregate growth of output per worker in our sample of ￿rms, and we give this moment 5 times
the weight of the micro-moments to ensure that we are in the ballpark of matching the aggregate
growth in the sample.
4 Results
4.1 Parameter Estimates
Table 1 reports the parameter estimates we obtain from the SMM procedure. The elasticity of
substitution is estimated to be " = 1:7. The estimate of the ￿xed cost of operation indicates that
the ratio of ￿xed workers to variable production workers is around 3%. The estimates also show
that high-type ￿rms are almost 3 times more innovative than low-type ￿rms (￿H=￿L ￿ 3). Entrants
have a 43% chance of being a high-type ￿rm (￿ = 0:43), and high-type ￿rms face an annual 9:5%
probability of transitioning to low-type (￿ = 0:095). We estimate the share of skilled workers as
7:8%. This share is in line with estimates that we can develop from the data. From the 1990 Census
of Populations, 3:9% of workers in the manufacturing sector have advanced degrees, while 16:2%
of workers have a bachelors￿degree or higher (including the 3:9%). The group of workers that
can e⁄ectively reallocate between managerial and R&D roles in ￿rms is likely bounded by these
two skill groups, and our estimate of 7:8% also falls in this range. About 30% of both groups of
workers are engaged in science and engineering occupations at the time of the Census. We discuss
the economic interpretation of the remaining parameters below.
Table 1. Parameter Estimates
# Parameter Description Value
1. " CES 1:701
2. ￿ Fixed cost of operation 0:032
3. LS Measure of high-skilled workers 0:078
4. ￿H Innovative capacity of high-type ￿rms 0:216
5. ￿L Innovative capacity of low-type ￿rms 0:070
6. ￿E Innovative capacity of entrants 0:202
7. ￿ Probability of being high-type entrant 0:428
8. ￿ Transition rate from high-type to low-type 0:095
9. ￿ Innovation step size 0:148
10. ￿ Innovation elasticity wrt knowledge stock 0:637
11. ’ Exogenous destruction rate 0:016
12. % Non-R&D innovation arrival rate 0:012
224.2 Goodness of Fit
Table 2 reports the empirical moments that we target and the predicted values from our model.
The addition of dashed lines in Figures 2A-D for the model-implied moments provides a graphical
depiction (except for moments 20 and 21, which are not shown in these ￿gures).
Table 2. Moment Matching
# Moments Model Data # Moments Model Data
1. Firm Exit (small) 0.086 0.093 12. Sales Growth (small) 0.115 0.051
2. Firm Exit (large) 0.060 0.041 13. Sales Growth (large) -0.004 0.013
3. Firm Exit (young) 0.078 0.102 14. Sales Growth (young) 0.070 0.071
4. Firm Exit (old) 0.068 0.050 15. Sales Growth (old) 0.030 0.014
5. Trans. from large to small 0.024 0.008 16. R&D to Sales (small) 0.097 0.099
6. Trans. from small to large 0.019 0.019 17. R&D to Sales (large) 0.047 0.042
7. Prob. of small (cond on entry) 0.539 0.715 18. R&D to Sales (young) 0.083 0.100
8. Emp. Growth (small) 0.063 0.051 19. R&D to Sales (old) 0.061 0.055
9. Emp. Growth (large) -0.007 0.013 20. 5-year Entrant Share 0.363 0.393
10. Emp. Growth (young) 0.040 0.070 21. Aggregate growth 0.022 0.022
11. Emp. Growth (old) 0.010 0.015
Figure 2A: Transition Rates Figure 2B: R&D Intensity
Figure 2C: Sales Growth Figure 2D: Employment Growth
Our estimation procedure generates a relatively good ￿t for all of the moments. In particular, for
most of the moments our model is able to replicate the salient characteristics of data, including lower
exit rates for larger and older ￿rms, similar transition rates across ￿rms sizes and entry/exit, similar
R&D/sales intensities by ￿rm sizes and ages, and a reasonably good ￿t for sales and employment
growth across di⁄erent types of ￿rms. Our growth rates for larger ￿rms are slightly negative in the
23model but slightly positive in the data. On the whole, despite the overidenti￿cation (matching 21
moments with 12 parameters), the ￿t is quite good.14
4.3 Decompositions
The equilibrium productivity growth of 2:24% can be decomposed into the contribution from en-
trants and incumbents. Entrants generate 58% of total productivity growth in the economy. More-
over, we estimate that 77% of the ￿rm-level growth, conditional on survival, comes from R&D
activities whereas the remaining 23% is generated through channels not related to R&D, which in
our model comes from the non-R&D arrival rate of new products, %.
In any given ￿ve-year window, new entrants employ 30% of production workers. It is worth
noticing that innovation in this model generates productivity growth through reallocation of inputs.
In equilibrium, 8% of the workers are reallocated within ￿rms across di⁄erent product lines, 12%
of the workers are reallocated across di⁄erent ￿rms, and the remaining 80% of the workers remain
within the same production unit during a ￿ve-year period.15
Our model has three sources of exit. The estimated model predicts that 81% of exits happen
due to creative destruction, 18% due to exogenous destructive shocks, and 1% due to obsolescence.
Though obsolescence appears small given the estimated parameter values, we will see that this
margin plays an important role in the comparison of the equilibrium to the optimal allocation.
4.4 Validation Tests
We validate our model in two ways. The ￿rst approach compares non-targeted moments and
correlations with those we observe in the data. The second approach compares the results we
obtain to micro estimates on the relationship between innovation and R&D expenditure and the
impact of R&D tax credits on innovation. Both approaches provide a type of out-of-sample test
of the structure imposed by our model as well as the values of the parameters we have estimated.
Reassuringly, we will see that our model performs fairly well in both cases, raising our con￿dence
in the model￿ s ability to provide a good approximation to data and the conclusions that will follow
from the policy experiments.
4.4.1 Non-Targeted Moments
We begin with several non-targeted moments that Table 3 summarizes. First, we examine the
correlation between exit probabilities and R&D intensity. These correlations are 0:04 and 0:05 in
the model and data, respectively. The exit probabilities for ￿rms with low and high R&D intensities
14We do not report tests of the overidentifying restrictions for the usual reason for this type of exercise that, given
our sample size, standard errors are tiny, and even the most minor deviation from these 21 moments would constitute
a rejection of the overidentifying restrictions. At the bottom of this, of course, is the fact that standard errors are
computed without allowing for ￿model misspeci￿cation￿ .
15For this computation, we assume that when workers are moved from a product line, they are ￿rst reallocated
within the ￿rm and then across ￿rms.
24are 0:32 and 0:34 in the data; these compare to 0:36 and 0:37 in the model. The correlation across
￿rms between R&D growth and employment growth is 0:19 in the data, but more than twice as
high, 0:48, in the model. This probably re￿ ects the fact that, despite non-R&D growth, we are
not capturing all of the reasons why employment grows at the ￿rm level. This last discrepancy not
withstanding, the model performs fairly well with respect to these non-targeted correlations, which
is reassuring.
Table 3: Non-targeted Moments
Moments Model Data
Corr(exit prob, R&D intensity) 0:04 0:05
Exit prob of low-R&D-intensive ￿rms 0:36 0:32
Exit prob of high-R&D-intensive ￿rms 0:37 0:34
Corr(R&D growth, emp growth) 0:48 0:19
Share ￿rm growth due to R&D 0:77 0:73
Ratio of top 7:2% to bottom 92:8% income 13:4 9:3
The R&D Survey collects a more detailed questionnaire from selected major R&D producers
that we can use to compare the contribution of R&D activities to growth in the model to data.16
First, the detailed questionnaire contains industry-level R&D breakouts. This disaggregation allows
us to validate the share of growth coming from non-R&D activities versus R&D activities. During
our sample period, we observe 160 ￿rms that continually conduct R&D and have industry-level
breakouts of their R&D expenditures. For these ￿rms, the unweighted mean share of employment
growth occurring within industries where ￿rms are conducting R&D is 73%. This estimate closely
￿ts our model￿ s prediction of 77% of growth coming through R&D e⁄orts.
Finally we examine the model￿ s prediction for the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages. In the
model, skilled workers, corresponding to managerial and science and engineering workers, making
up a fraction 7:2%(= 0:078=(1 + 0:078)) of the population, earn ws and unskilled workers earn wu:
This corresponds to a ratio of the average income of the top 7:2% to the average income of the
bottom 92:8% of ws=wu = 13:4: The corresponding number from the IRS micro income data for all
taxpayers in the United States in 2010 is about 9:3 (comparing top 7% of earners to bottom 93%).17
Even though the upper bound of this range is still about 40% smaller than our model￿ s prediction,
we view this as broadly in the ballpark of this number, even though none of our moments targeted
this ratio.
4.4.2 Comparison to Micro Estimates
One relevant set of comparable estimates for ￿ can be taken from the literature evaluating the
empirical relationship between patents and R&D expenditures. Griliches (1990) surveyed a prior
literature and concluded that the elasticity of patents with respect to R&D, 1 ￿ ￿ in our model, is
16Kerr and Fu (2008) provide greater details on the selection of ￿rms to complete the long forms.
17Statistics from http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/article/0￿ id=98123,00.html" IRS Individual Income Tax
Statistics. Further details can be found on http://www.inequalityandtaxes.com
25between 0:3 and 0:6 which implies ￿ 2 [0:4;0:7]. Work since that time has continued to ￿nd similar
results. Using count data models, Blundell, Gri¢ th, and Windmeijer (2002) report an elasticity of
0:5. Hall and Zeidonis (2001) ￿nd similar results in a study of the semiconductor industry. We thus
conclude that our estimate of ￿ = 0:64 falls right in the middle of the range of plausible estimates
in the literature.
A second approach is to compare our estimate of ￿ to the ￿ndings of the studies that considered
the response of ￿rms to changes in the cost of R&D driven by R&D tax credits. A growing
literature examines the impact of R&D tax credits on the R&D expenditure of ￿rms. One route
uses the variation in the US tax code over time interacted with ￿rms￿tax paying and R&D status
to generate time and ￿rm variation in the tax-component of the user cost of R&D. These studies
typically ￿nd a tax elasticity of R&D around unity (e.g., Hall, 1992). A second approach followed
by Bloom et al. (2002) exploits time-variation in cross-country R&D tax credits, while a third
approach followed by Wilson (2009) exploits time-variation in cross-state R&D tax credits in the
United States. Estimates in this literature also cluster around unity, as emphasized in the survey
paper by Hall and Van Reenen (2000) who state in their conclusion that ￿a tax price elasticity of
around unity is a good ball-park ￿gure￿ . In our model, the R&D elasticity with respect to scientist
wage ws is:18 %￿R&D
%￿ws =
￿￿1
￿ , so the unit elasticity would correspond to ￿ = 0:5. Our estimate,
￿ = 0:64, is again in the ballpark, about 20% higher. In Section 6, we show that re-estimating our
model imposing ￿ = 0:5 leads to very similar results, particularly in our policy experiments.
5 Policy Experiments and E¢ ciency
Our estimated model has an equilibrium growth rate of 2:24%. This is driven by the innovation
e⁄orts of the high-type incumbents, low-type incumbents and entrants.
Table 4. Baseline Model
xentry xl xh m ￿l ￿h ^ ql;min ^ qh;min dropl
ws
wu ￿ g Wel
8.46 2.80 9.58 73.6 71.16 24.53 13.90 0.00 0.06 13.64 10.58 2.24 100
Note: All numbers except wage ratio and welfare are in percentage terms, so for example, xh= 9.58 is equivalent to xh = 0.0958.
Table 4 above summarizes some of the key endogenous equilibrium objects. In the baseline, high-
type incumbents are almost three times as likely to innovate (per product) as low-type ￿rms (xh =
0:096 vs. xl = 0:028). The total entry rate is 6.23% (￿ xentry ￿m = 0:085￿0:736). In equilibrium,
71:2% of the product lines belong to low-type ￿rms and 24:5% to high-type ￿rms (￿h = 0:712 vs.
￿l = 0:245). The remaining 4:3% of product lines are inactive. The average creative destruction
in the economy is 10:6% (￿ = 0:106). In addition, the annual obsolescence rate for low-type ￿rms,
shown as dropl in the table, is 0:06%, while the obsolescence rate for high-type ￿rms is very close
to zero (for this reason and to save space, we do not report it in this and the subsequent tables).
18To see this, substitute the equilibrium innovation choice (15) into R&D cost function (6) to obtain R&D =
n￿
k (w
s)
￿￿1
￿ ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)E￿
k (^ q (1 + ￿))
￿ 1
￿ :
26Figure 3 shows the productivity distribution across product lines among high- and low-type
￿rms. An important point to note is that the cuto⁄ productivity for high-type ￿rms is lower since
the option value of operating in a product line is higher for them.
Figure 3. Productivity Distributions by Type
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5.1 Incumbent R&D Subsidy
Our ￿rst policy counterfactual considers a popular type of industrial policy, subsidizing R&D e⁄orts
of incumbents. In Table 5, we show the results when using 1% of GDP and then 5% of GDP for
such subsidies.19
Table 5. Incumbent R&D Subsidy
Panel A. 1% of GDP (si = 15%)
xentry xl xh m ￿l ￿h ^ ql;min ^ qh;min dropl
ws
wu ￿ g Wel
8.46 3.05 10.56 68.10 70.74 24.96 13.40 0.00 0.06 13.88 10.55 2.23 99.86
Panel B. 5% of GDP (si = 39%)
8.46 3.61 13.04 49.76 69.58 25.97 13.15 0.00 0.05 14.97 10.11 2.16 98.48
Note: All numbers except wage ratio and welfare are in percentage terms.
Panel A considers a subsidy equivalent to 1% of GDP, which amounts to a 15% subsidy on
R&D spending of incumbents. As should have been expected, the R&D subsidy to incumbents
increases their R&D. In particular, low-type ￿rms increase their innovation rate from 2:80% to
3:05%, and high-type ￿rms from 9:58% to 10:56%￿ both of these are about 10% higher than the
baseline. However, the overall impact on innovation and growth is less￿ much less￿ than this direct
e⁄ect. This is for two reasons. First, at a given skilled wage, greater incumbent R&D would increase
creative destruction and via this channel discourage entry. Second, and more important, the greater
demand for skilled workers from incumbent R&D increases the skilled wage. In equilibrium, we see
that there is a non-trivial (approximately 2%) increase in the skill wage, from 13.64 to 13.88, and
this reduces R&D by entrants and incumbents su¢ ciently that overall creative destruction does not
19Throughout to focus on the economic channels in our model, we assume that these subsidies are not wasted and
do not create additional tax distortions.
27increase. But the measure of entrants decreases from 0:74 to 0:68 and the total entry rate declines
from 8:46 ￿ 0:74 ￿ 6:22 to 8:46 ￿ 0:68 ￿ 5:76. The overall result is a decline in growth 2:24% to
2:23%, and aggregate welfare also decreases by 0:14% (in consumption equivalent terms).
Panel B shows similar results with a subsidy equivalent to 5% of GDP. The subsidy now rises
to 39% on R&D spending of incumbents, and its impact on growth and welfare are more negative.
Growth declines from 2:24% to 2:16%, and welfare declines by 1:5%.
In summary, in contrast to expectations in the literature and in policy circles which, based on
the view that there is underinvestment in R&D, consider R&D subsidies as growth and welfare
enhancing, we ￿nd that R&D subsidies to incumbents reduce growth and welfare because they
reallocate resources from entrants to incumbents.
5.2 Subsidy to Operating Costs
We next consider an industrial policy subsidizing the continued operation of incumbents by subsi-
dizing their ￿xed costs of operations ws￿, which approximates policies that support large ￿rms that
are in economic trouble.20 We suppose that the costs of operation by incumbents are subsidized
with an amount equivalent to 1% of GDP (Panel A) and 5% of GDP (Panel B). The main impact
of this change in policy is to lower obsolescence, which was, however, already low. The implications
of this subsidy are presented in Table 6.
Table 6. Operation Subsidy
Panel A. 1% of GDP (so = 6%)
xentry xl xh m ￿l ￿h ^ ql;min ^ qh;min dropl
ws
wu ￿ g Wel
8.46 2.80 9.59 73.66 71.30 24.52 11.74 0.00 0.05 13.86 10.58 2.22 99.82
Panel B. 5% of GDP (so = 27%)
8.47 2.80 9.59 73.31 71.72 24.49 4.37 0.00 0.02 14.78 10.57 2.16 99.20
Focusing on Panel A, we see that this policy, which corresponds to a 6% subsidy to operating
costs, discourages obsolescence and increases the share of active product lines (from 95:69% to
95:81%) and raises the demand for skilled workers coming from the ￿xed costs of operation. The
general equilibrium implications of this is a reduction in R&D for all ￿rms resulting from the
higher skilled wage, which is about 2% higher (13.86 compared to 13.64). However, this subsidy
also has a negative selection e⁄ect because low-type ￿rms are overrepresented among those at the
margin of obsolescence. As a result, the share of low-type ￿rms in the economy increases from
71:16% to 71:30% (while the share of high-type ￿rms declines slightly). As part of this, resources
are reallocated from more-e¢ cient to less-e¢ cient product lines (since this subsidy directly helps
only those product lines near the lower end of the productivity distribution). In consequence, the
long-run growth rate declines from 2:24% to 2:22%, and aggregate welfare declines by 0:18%.
20Or equivalently, their exit is taxed or some combination thereof. We consider subsidies or taxes on the ￿xed cost
of operations rather than on all costs or on accounting pro￿ts, because these alternative policies would also a⁄ect
markups, partly confounding the main e⁄ect we are interested in. All the same, such subsidies or taxes have broadly
similar impacts.
28The results in Panel B are similar, and the decline in growth is identical to what we saw in
Table 5. Interestingly, however, the welfare decline is about half of that in Panel B of Table 5. The
main reason for this is that with 5% of GDP spent on subsidizing operating costs, there is a more
sizable expansion of the set of active products (from 95:69% to 96:21%), and having more products
active bene￿ts consumers (recall footnote 6). Nevertheless, this bene￿t is more than outweighed
by the selection e⁄ect, which is the reason why welfare declines.
In sum, a subsidy to the operating costs of incumbents reduces growth and welfare because
it causes a negative selection e⁄ect, increasing the share of product lines controlled by low-type
￿rms, as low-type ￿rms tend to bene￿t more from this subsidy which is directed to low-productivity
product lines.
5.3 Entry Subsidy
Finally, for comparison, we also consider the implications of an entry subsidy equivalent to ￿rst 1%
and then 5% of GDP. The results are reported in Table 7.
The direct e⁄ect of the entry subsidy is to increase entry. In Panel A, the measure of entrants
increases from 73:6% to 75:3%, and there is a slight increase in their R&D intensity. The demand
for skilled labor that additional entry induces raises the skilled wage by 3% (from 13:64 to 14:06).
Table 7. Entry Subsidy
Panel A. 1% of GDP (se = 5%)
xentry xl xh m ￿l ￿h ^ ql;min ^ qh;min dropl
ws
wu ￿ g Wel
8.46 2.73 9.30 75.3 71.16 24.41 15.91 0.00 0.07 14.06 10.59 2.26 100.15
Panel B. 5% of GDP (se = 20%)
8.47 2.49 8.35 80.0 71.01 24.01 24.10 0.00 0.11 15.75 10.55 2.32 100.63
Note: All numbers except wage ratio and welfare are in percentage terms.
As was the case with incumbent R&D subsidies, the overall impact of the entry subsidy on growth
is less than that induced by the change in the entry rate because, this time, the implied increase
in the creative destruction rate and the higher skilled wages discourage innovation by incumbents.
In consequence, Table 7 shows that low-type ￿rms reduce their innovation rate from 2:80% to
2:73%, and high-type ￿rms reduce theirs from 9:58% to 9:30%. With these two o⁄setting e⁄ects,
the aggregate creative destruction rate remains essentially unchanged. Another interesting general
equilibrium e⁄ect works through obsolescence. The higher skilled wage increases the threshold for
exit, especially for low types (which increases from 0:139 to 0:159). This raises the obsolescence
rate for low-type ￿rms, and generates a bene￿cial selection e⁄ects, also contributing to growth.
Therefore, the overall e⁄ect of the entry subsidy in Panel A is to increase the long-run growth rate
of the economy from 2:24% to 2:26%, and aggregate welfare by 0:15%.
In Panel B, the overall pattern is similar, but the e⁄ects are somewhat larger. Growth now
increases from 2:24% to 2:32%, and welfare increases by 0:63%.
29In summary, an entry subsidy has a positive e⁄ect on growth and welfare, but even with a
subsidy amounting to 5% of GDP, this impact is small.
5.4 Social Planner
The results of the previous subsection might suggest that the equilibrium is close to optimal, and
this is the reason why subsidies to incumbent R&D do not increase growth or welfare, and subsidies
to entrants have a small e⁄ect. In this subsection, we will see that this is very far from the truth.
We characterize the allocation that a welfare-maximizing social planner would choose. Since
we are not interested in monopoly distortions per se, we restrict the social planner to the same
production and pricing decisions as the equilibrium, and only allow her to control the entry, exit and
R&D margins of di⁄erent ￿rms. It is straightforward to see that the social planner will choose the
same per product R&D rate for all high- and low-type ￿rms. Then, we can represent the problem
of the planner as choosing f^ qh;min; ^ ql;min;m;xh;xl;xentryg to maximize representative household
welfare (26) subject to the skilled labor market clearing condition (19).
Table 8 summarizes the allocation implied by social planner￿ s choices.
Table 8. Social Planner
xentry xl xh m ￿l ￿h ^ ql;min ^ qh;min dropl ￿ g Wel
8.46 2.55 10.47 80.90 54.06 27.76 118.6 1.02 1.11 11.13 3.80 106.46
Several results are noteworthy. First, the social planner can improve growth and welfare greatly.
Growth increases from 2.24% to 3.8%￿ a 70% increase in the growth rate. Welfare increases by
6.46%. This result clearly establishes that the equilibrium was far from optimal. It was just that
the three policy variations we considered were not the right ones for moving the economy towards
a better allocation of resources.
Second, we can also see from Table 8 how the optimal allocation should look like. To start
with, the obsolescence channel is now much stronger. Instead of 0:06% of low-type ￿rms exiting
this channel, we now have 1.11% doing so (^ ql;min increases from 13:9 to 118:6, and the share of
obsolescences in total exits increases from 1% to 15%). Also important is that the social planner
increases R&D by high-type incumbents relative to the baseline (from xh = 0:096 to 0:104), while
at the same time reducing R&D by low-types (from xl = 0:028 to 0:026). The result of all these
changes is a very signi￿cant selection relative to the equilibrium: the ratio of high- to low-type
￿rms increases from 0.34 to 0.51). This selection e⁄ect is at the root of the very large increase in
growth and welfare. To be able to achieve this positive selection, the social planner keeps active a
smaller fraction of product lines (though this is costly for welfare, the cost is more than outweighed
by the bene￿cial selection). The social planner also increases the entry rate relative to equilibrium
(m increases from 0.73 to 0.81).
We also computed the gains from the social planner￿ s allocation relative to the equilibrium by
shutting o⁄ the selection margin. The results reported in Table B1 in Appendix B show that, even
30though the social planner can again improve over the equilibrium, the extent of this improvement
is more limited (less than half of that in Table 8), highlighting the critical role that the selection
e⁄ect plays in our results.
5.5 Optimal Policy
The social planner￿ s allocation discussed in the previous subsection relied on choosing the exit
threshold and R&D rates of di⁄erent types of ￿rms. In practice, this type of detailed intervention
may not be possible (for instance, ￿rm type might be private information). A more reasonable set of
policies might involve using: subsidies and/or taxes on (i) incumbent R&D; (ii) costs of operation;
(iii) entry. We analyze the optimal combination of these three policies in Panel A of Table 9.
The results are interesting. With these three instruments, each of which appeared fairly ine⁄ec-
tive by itself, we can come quite close to the social planner￿ s allocation. In particular, welfare can be
increased by 4:56% and growth goes up to 3:12%. This is achieved again by leveraging the selection
e⁄ect, and involves a very large tax on the continued operation of all incumbents (a 246% tax).21
In addition, there is a modest subsidy to incumbent R&D and to entry (17% and 6%, respectively).
The resulting allocation comes close to, but does not reach the social planner￿ s allocation in the
previous subsection. For example, the obsolescence rate is 0:77% instead of 1:11%, and the ratio of
high- to low-types is now 41% (instead of 51% under the social planner￿ s allocation). Furthermore,
with these instruments, it is not possible to simultaneously increase R&D by high-type ￿rms and
reduce it by the low-types, and for this reason, we see that the R&D rate by both types is now
higher than in the baseline.
Table 9. Policy Analysis and Welfare
Panel A. Optimal Incumbent and Entry Policies (si = 17%;so = ￿246%;se = 6%)
xentry xl xh m ￿l ￿h ^ ql;min ^ qh;min dropl
ws
wu ￿ g Wel
8.46 3.04 10.20 75.4 62.17 25.53 96.39 56.01 0.77 9.02 10.88 3.12 104.56
Panel B. Optimal Incumbent Policies (si = 12%;so = ￿264%)
8.47 3.04 10.21 75.3 62.31 25.53 95.38 54.85 0.76 8.53 10.88 3.11 104.56
Though subsidizing incumbent R&D and taxing their operating costs (or subsidizing their exit)
is in principle straightforward, subsidizing entry may be more di¢ cult, because this corresponds,
in our model, to the entry of innovative ￿rms, and R&D subsidies to non-existing ￿rms may not
be feasible. Therefore, arguably, relying just on incumbent policies (subsidies to incumbent R&D
and subsidies or taxes on operations) may be more reasonable. Panel B shows that just focusing
on these two policies essentially generates the same bene￿ts. When thus restricted, it would be
optimal to increase the tax on operations further, to 264%, and reduce incumbent subsidies to R&D
21Recall that this is a tax on the ￿xed costs of operation, w
s￿, not on all costs or revenues of ￿rms. The 246% tax
on the ￿xed costs of operation of incumbents is equivalent to an average tax of 26% on the revenues of incumbents.
31to 12% (so as not to discourage entry too much). These policies achieve almost the same growth
increases and essentially the same welfare increase.
In summary, optimal policies can aggressively tax the operations of incumbents to encourage
low-type ￿rms to exit, thus exploiting the selection e⁄ect to increase the ratio of high-type ￿rms to
low-type ￿rms. This can raise the growth rate of the economy to above 3:1% and increase welfare
by more than 4:5%. Entry subsidies or subsidies to incumbent R&D do not achieve this objective,
and this is the reason why we did not see major￿ or any￿ bene￿ts from these policies. But they
can be combined with very high taxes on the continued operation of incumbents to achieve major
growth and welfare gains.
6 Robustness
In this section, we report the results of a few robustness exercises, which illustrate that the main
results reported so far￿ in particular, the ability of the model to match the broad patterns in the
micro data and the contrast between di⁄erent types of industrial policies￿ are fairly robust. To
save space, we discuss these results brie￿ y, and the relevant tables are contained in Appendix B.
6.1 Imposing ￿ = 0:5
As discussed in Section 4.4.2, though our estimate of ￿ = 0:64 is in the middle of micro estimates
of the elasticity of innovation to R&D expenditures, it is a little higher than more recent estimates
based on instrumental-variable strategies exploiting changes in R&D tax credits. In this subsection,
we show that our main results are robust to imposing the central estimate of this more recent
literature, ￿ = 0:5.
For this purpose, we reestimated all of the parameters of our model, except that we imposed
￿ = 0:5. The remaining parameter estimates and the match between model-generated and data
moments are a⁄ected relatively little, and as a result, the implications of di⁄erent industrial policies
also remain broadly similar to our baseline. Analogous results to those in Tables 4￿9 are contained
in Tables B2 and B3 Industrial policies (subsidies to incumbents) again reduce welfare, and subsidies
to entrants again have a very small positive e⁄ect on growth and welfare. The social planner,
instead, would be able to increase welfare by 2%, and optimal policies just directed at incumbents
(R&D subsidies and taxes on continued operations) can increase welfare by 1:7%.
6.2 Imposing % = 0
In our model, the parameter % regulates the share of productivity growth unrelated to R&D ac-
tivities. Although, as Table 3 shows, the implied estimate of this share in our model is in the
ballpark of what we observe from the subsample of ￿rms for which we can derive an estimate of it
in the data (27% in the data as opposed to our estimates of 23%), none of our 21 moments directly
target the parameter %. It is therefore informative to investigate whether the speci￿c value for this
32parameter plays an important role in our results. With this purpose, we reestimated the model￿ s
remaining parameters imposing % = 0 (an extreme value but in line with what is implicitly imposed
in other models of this sort). Tables B4 and B5 show that the implications of this restriction on our
policy analysis are relatively minor. Subsidies to incumbents again reduce welfare and subsidies
to entrants again have a very small positive e⁄ect. The social planner can now increase welfare
by even a more striking amount (11%), because R&D activities and selection become even more
important. The combination of incumbent R&D subsidies and taxes on continued operations can
now achieve quite a bit less than the social planner￿ s allocation, but still signi￿cantly more than
the equilibrium: growth increases to 3:3% and welfare can be increased by 5:9%.
6.3 Fixed Entrant Supply
Our results so far show that the entry margin is very elastic￿ policies leave the R&D rate of
entrants, xentry, largely unchanged and impact mainly m. One might be worried about whether
this exaggerates how elastic the entry margin is. To see if this very elastic entry margin is partially
responsible for our results, we reestimated all of the model parameters by imposing m = 1, so that
all variations in entry come from the intensive margin, xentry (which is less elastic because of the
complex R&D technology in (5)). With this modi￿cation, the ￿t of the model remains comparable
to our baseline, and Tables B6 and B7 show that the results of the policy analysis are also broadly
comparable. One di⁄erence is that in this case, subsidies to incumbent R&D have a small positive
e⁄ect on welfare, rather than the negative e⁄ect we have seen in all the other cases so far. This
re￿ ects the fact that, with a less elastic entry margin, the cost of incumbent R&D in terms of
reduced entry is less pronounced. The remaining results are very similar to those reported above.
Subsidies to incumbent operations reduce welfare, and the social planner would be able to improve
growth and welfare by leveraging the selection e⁄ect. In particular, the social planner can increase
welfare by 2:6%, and just using subsidies to incumbent R&D and taxes on operations can increase
welfare by 1:2%.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we build a micro-founded model of ￿rm innovation and growth. The model enables us
an examination of the forces jointly driving innovation, productivity growth and reallocation. We
estimate the parameters of the model using simulated method of moments on detailed US Census
Bureau micro data on employment, output, R&D and patenting. Our model ￿ts the key moments
from microdata reasonably well, and also performs well on non-targeted moments and is in line
with the range of micro estimates in the literature.
We use the model to investigate the implications of several types of industrial policies on long-
run growth and welfare. We ￿nd that industrial policies (subsidies to incumbent R&D or to their
operating costs) reduce growth and welfare, while entry subsidies have a positive but very small
33e⁄ect. These small e⁄ects are not because the equilibrium of our model is approximately optimal.
On the contrary, a social planner limited to a⁄ecting only R&D, entry and exit decisions can
increase growth from 2:24% to 3:8%, and increase welfare by 6:46%. The social planner achieves
this by strongly leveraging the selection e⁄ect. She forces low-type incumbents to exit at a very high
rate, reduces their R&D, and increases the R&D of high-type incumbents. Interestingly, relying
on just subsidies to incumbent R&D and taxes on the continued operation of incumbents comes
close to achieving this welfare gain (by introducing a very high tax on the continued operation of
incumbents).
Our general equilibrium model which incorporates both reallocation and selection e⁄ects high-
lights the potential pitfalls of industrial policies supporting incumbents, particularly large incum-
bents. It also cautions against policies based on the prior that, because there is underinvestment
in R&D all R&D-type activities should be subsidized. Entry does indeed play an important role
in our estimated model, but it turns out to be much better to support entry by freeing resources
from ine¢ cient, low-type incumbents rather than subsidizing entry directly.
Several further topics of inquiry are left for future research. First, it would be interesting to
extend our analysis to incorporate an endogenous selection between non-innovation and innovation,
and also to incorporate reallocation of other resources (unskilled labor and capital). Second, our
analysis has been con￿ned to steady-state (balanced growth path) comparisons. It is likely that
even our limited welfare gains from various types of industrial policy will be even more muted when
transitional dynamics are taken into account (and it remains an open question whether the social
planner can still signi￿cantly improve over the equilibrium allocation). Third, we have abstracted
from costs of adjustment, which are important both for ￿rms and workers, and may reduce the gains
from reallocation. Fourth and related is a possible extension of this framework to model the joint
dynamics of innovation, reallocation and unemployment, which can enrich the analysis of the e⁄ects
of various policies, and also enable us to incorporate some of the potential unemployment bene￿ts
of supporting incumbent producers. Fifth, we have also abstracted from political constraints. It
would be important to consider the political economy of di⁄erent types of industrial policies, which
have often been politically di¢ cult to manage and prone to capture. Sixth, our model can also
be used to study mergers between high- and low-type ￿rms which might be able to make more
e¢ cient use of the existing knowledge stock of low-type ￿rms in certain circumstances. Finally,
supplementing our approach with more direct estimation of the costs and bene￿ts of di⁄erent types
of policies targeted at R&D by incumbents is a major area for future research.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider the low-type ￿rms and conjecture ~ Vl
￿
^ Q
￿
=
X
^ q2 ^ Q ￿l (^ q) :
r
X
^ q2 ^ Q
￿l (^ q) =
X
^ q2 ^ Q
max
(
0;max
x
"
~ ￿ (^ qj) ￿ ~ ws￿s ￿ ~ wsG
￿
x;￿L￿
+
@￿l(^ q)
@^ q
@^ q
@wu
@wu
@t
+xE￿l (^ q (1 + ￿)) + ^ %E￿l (^ q) ￿ (￿ + ’)￿l (^ q)
#)
:
37This expression reduces to
r￿l (^ q) = max
(
0;
(
~ ￿ (^ q) ￿ ~ ws￿s +
@￿l(^ q)
@^ q
@^ q
@wu
@wu
@t ￿ (￿ + ’)￿l (^ q)
+^ %E￿l (^ q) + maxx
￿
xE￿l (^ q (1 + ￿)) ￿ ~ wsG
￿
x;￿L￿￿
))
where we also use the fact that a ￿rm can choose not to operate an individual product line.
Next consider the high-type ￿rms and conjecture ~ Vh
￿
^ Q
￿
=
X
^ q2 ^ Q ￿h (^ q) :
r
X
^ q2 ^ Q
￿h (^ q) =
X
^ q2 ^ Q
max
8
> <
> :
0;max
x
2
6
4
~ ￿ (^ q) ￿ ~ ws￿s ￿ ~ wsG
￿
x;￿H￿
+
@￿h(^ q)
@^ q
@^ q
@wu
@wu
@t
+xE￿h (^ q (1 + ￿)) + ^ %E￿h (^ q)
￿(￿ + ’)￿h (^ q) + ￿
￿
I^ q>^ ql;min ￿ ￿l (^ q) ￿ ￿h (^ q)
￿
3
7
5
9
> =
> ;
which, with similar steps, reduces to
r￿h (^ q) = max
8
> <
> :
0;max
x
2
6
4
~ ￿ (^ q) ￿ ~ ws￿s ￿ ~ wsG
￿
x;￿H￿
+
@￿(^ q)
@^ q
@^ q
@wu
@wu
@t +
xE￿(^ q (1 + ￿)) + ^ %E￿h (^ q)
￿(￿ + ’)￿(^ q) + ￿
￿
I^ q>^ ql;min ￿ ￿l (^ q) ￿ ￿h (^ q)
￿
3
7
5
9
> =
> ;
:
Monotonicity follows from the fact that the per-period return function is increasing in ^ q.
Proof of Proposition 1. First note that ~ ￿ (q) =
￿"￿1
"
￿" 1
"￿1^ q"￿1 = ￿^ q"￿1. Then, de￿ning
￿ ￿ r + ￿ + ’, equation (14) can be written as the following linear di⁄erential equation
￿￿l (^ q) + g^ q
@￿l (^ q)
@^ q
= ￿^ q"￿1 + ￿l ￿ ~ ws￿ if ^ q > ^ ql;min
or
￿1^ q￿1￿l (^ q) +
@￿l (^ q)
@^ q
= ￿2^ q"￿2 ￿ ￿3^ q￿1 (28)
where ￿1 ￿ ￿
g ; ￿2 ￿ ￿
g and ￿3 ￿
~ ws￿￿￿l
g . Then the solution to (28) can be written as
￿l (^ q) = ^ q￿￿1
￿Z h
￿2^ q￿1+"￿2 ￿ ￿3^ q￿1￿1
i
dx + D
￿
=
￿2^ q"￿1
￿1 + " ￿ 1
￿
￿3
￿1
+ D^ q￿￿1;
where
f (^ q) ￿ ￿1^ q￿1; y (^ q) ￿ ￿l (^ q) and g (^ q) ￿ ￿2^ q"￿2 ￿ ￿3^ q￿1:
Imposing the boundary condition ￿l (^ ql;min) = 0, we can solve out for the constant of integration
D, obtaining
￿l (^ q) =
￿2^ q"￿1
￿1 + " ￿ 1
￿
￿3
￿1
+
"
￿3^ q
￿1
l;min
￿1
￿
￿2^ q
￿1+"￿1
l;min
￿1 + " ￿ 1
#
^ q￿￿1 (29)
=
￿^ q"￿1
￿ + (" ￿ 1)g
"
1 ￿
￿
^ ql;min
^ q
￿ ￿
g +"￿1#
+
￿l ￿ ~ ws￿
￿
"
1 ￿
￿
^ ql;min
^ q
￿ ￿
g
#
:
The derivation of the value for a high-type product line is similar and is provided in the online
appendix.
38Proof of Proposition 2. Let Qt ￿
hR
Nt q"￿1
jt dj
i 1
"￿1 and
~ Qt ￿ Q"￿1
t =
Z
Nt
q"￿1
jt dj =
Z
Nh
t
q"￿1
jt dj +
Z
Nl
t
q"￿1
jt dj = ~ Qh
t + ~ Ql
t;
where ~ Qk
t ￿
R
Nk
t q"￿1
jt dj. Clearly,
@ ~ Qt= ~ Qt
@t
=
~ Qh
~ Qh
t + ~ Ql
t
gh +
~ Ql
~ Qh
t + ~ Ql
t
gl
where gk =
@ ~ Qk
@t
1
~ Qk for k 2 fh;lg:
Now to ￿nd gh, let us write
~ Qh
t+￿t =
8
> > > <
> > > :
R
Nh
t
￿ ￿
xh + ￿Xentry￿
￿t((1 + ￿)qjt)
"￿1
+(1 ￿ ￿￿t ￿ ￿￿t ￿ ’￿t)[1 ￿ Fh ((1 + g￿t) ^ qh;min)]q"￿1
jt
￿
dj
+
R
Nl
t
￿
xh + ￿Xentry￿
￿t((1 + ￿)qjt)
"￿1 dj
+
R
N
np
t
￿
xh + ￿Xentry + %￿h￿
￿tEq"￿1
t+￿tdj
9
> > > =
> > > ;
Hence
lim
￿t!0
~ Qh
t+￿t ￿ ~ Qh
t
~ Qh
t ￿t
=
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
￿
xh + ￿Xentry￿
(1 + ￿)
"￿1
￿g^ qh;minfh (^ qh;min) ￿ [￿ + ￿ + ’]
+
￿
xh + ￿Xentry￿
(1 + ￿)
"￿1 ~ Ql
t
~ Qh
t
+
￿
xh + ￿Xentry + %￿h￿ ￿npEq"￿1
t
~ Qh
t
9
> > > > =
> > > > ;
(30)
gh =
8
<
:
￿
xh + ￿Xentry￿h
(1 + ￿)
"￿1
￿
1 +
~ Ql
t
~ Qh
t
￿
+
￿npEq"￿1
t
~ Qh
t
i
￿g^ qh;minfh (^ qh;min) + %￿h ￿npEq"￿1
t
~ Qh
t
￿ [￿ + ￿ + ’]
9
=
;
Similarly for gl, we have
~ Ql
t+￿t =
8
> > > <
> > > :
￿
xl + (1 ￿ ￿)Xentry￿
￿t(1 + ￿)
"￿1 ~ Ql
t
￿Fl ((1 + g￿t) ^ ql;min) ~ Ql
t + ~ Ql
t ￿ [￿ + ’]￿t ~ Ql
t
+
h￿
xl + (1 ￿ ￿)Xentry￿
(1 + ￿)
"￿1 + ￿ [1 ￿ Fh (^ ql;min)]
i
￿t ~ Ql
t
+
￿
xl + (1 ￿ ￿)Xentry + %￿l￿
￿t￿npEq"￿1
t+￿t
9
> > > =
> > > ;
;
which with similar steps yields
gl =
8
<
:
￿
xl + (1 ￿ ￿)Xentry￿h
(1 + ￿)
"￿1
￿
1 +
~ Qh
t
~ Ql
t
￿
+
￿npEq"￿1
t
~ Ql
t
i
+￿ [1 ￿ Fh (^ ql;min)]
~ Qh
t
~ Ql
t
+ %￿l ￿npEq"￿1
t
~ Ql
t
￿ g^ ql;minfl (^ ql;min) ￿ [￿ + ’]
9
=
;
:
In the stationary equilibrium, ~ Qh
t = ~ Ql
t is constant, and hence gh = gl, which implies
8
> > > <
> > > :
￿
xh + ￿Xentry￿
2
4
(1 + ￿)
"￿1
￿
1 +
~ Ql
t
~ Qh
t
￿
+
￿npEq"￿1
t
~ Qh
t
3
5
+%
￿npEq"￿1
t
~ Qh
t
h
￿h ￿ ￿l ~ Qh
t
~ Ql
t
i
9
> > > =
> > > ;
=
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
￿
xl + (1 ￿ ￿)Xentry￿
2
4
(1 + ￿)
"￿1
￿
1 +
~ Qh
~ Ql
t
￿
+
￿npEq"￿1
t
~ Ql
t
3
5
+￿
h
1 + [1 ￿ Fh (^ ql;min)]
~ Qh
t
~ Ql
t
i
+g [^ qh;minfh (^ qh;min) ￿ ^ ql;minfl (^ ql;min)]
9
> > > > > =
> > > > > ;
39Finally, de￿ning
~ Qh
t
~ Ql
t
￿ ￿;
￿npEq"￿1
t
~ Qh
t
￿ {h and
￿npEq"￿1
t
~ Ql
t
￿ {l, we obtain
( ￿
xh + ￿Xentry￿h
(1 + ￿)
"￿1 ￿
1 + 1
￿
￿
+ {h
i
+%{h
￿
￿h ￿ ￿l￿
￿
)
=
8
> <
> :
￿
xl + (1 ￿ ￿)Xentry￿h
(1 + ￿)
"￿1 (1 + ￿) + {l
i
+￿ [1 + [1 ￿ Fh (^ ql;min)]￿]
+g [^ qh;minfh (^ qh;min) ￿ ^ ql;minfl (^ ql;min)]
9
> =
> ;
(31)
Imposing g =
gh
"￿1 =
gl
"￿1 and using (30) completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 3. In a stationary equilibrium in￿ ows and out￿ ows into di⁄erent parts of
the distributions have to be equal. Considering a time interval of ￿t, this implies ￿hFh (^ q;t) =
￿hFh (^ q;t + ￿t) for
￿hFh (^ q) =
8
> <
> :
￿h (1 ￿ (￿ + ’ + ￿)￿t)[Fh (^ q (1 + g￿t)) ￿ Fh (^ qh;min (1 + g￿t))]
+
￿
￿hxh + ￿Xentry￿
￿t
"
￿hFh
￿
^ q
1+g￿t
1+￿
￿
+ ￿lFl
￿
^ q
1+g￿t
1+￿
￿
+
￿
1 ￿ ￿h ￿ ￿l￿
F (^ q)
#
9
> =
> ;
; ^ qh;crit < ^ q
￿hFh (^ q) = ￿h (1 ￿ (￿ + ’ + ￿)￿t)[Fh (^ q (1 + g￿t)) ￿ Fh (^ qh;min (1 + g￿t))];
^ qh;min (1 + g￿t)
< ^ q ￿ ^ qh;crit
where ^ qs;crit ￿ ^ qs;min (1 + ￿); s 2 fl;hg. With a similar reasoning, we also have
￿lFl (^ q) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
￿l (1 ￿ (￿ + ’)￿t)[Fl (^ q (1 + g￿t)) ￿ Fl (^ ql;min (1 + g￿t))]
+
￿
￿lxl + (1 ￿ ￿)Xentry￿
￿t
"
￿hFh
￿
^ q
1+g￿t
1+￿
￿
+ ￿lFl
￿
^ q
1+g￿t
1+￿
￿
+
￿
1 ￿ ￿h ￿ ￿l￿
F (^ q)
#
+￿￿t￿h [Fh (^ q (1 + g￿t)) ￿ Fh (^ ql;min (1 + g￿t))]
9
> > > =
> > > ;
; ^ ql;crit < ^ q
￿lFl (^ q) =
￿
￿l (1 ￿ (￿ + ’)￿t)[Fl (^ q (1 + g￿t)) ￿ Fl (^ ql;min (1 + g￿t))]
+￿￿t￿h [Fh (^ q (1 + g￿t)) ￿ Fh (^ ql;min (1 + g￿t))]
￿
;
^ ql;min (1 + g￿t)
< ^ q ￿ ^ ql;crit
Next, subtract ￿sFs (^ q (1 + g￿t)) from both sides, multiply both sides by ￿1, divide again both
sides by ￿t, and take the limit as ￿t ! 0, so that
lim
￿t!0
Fs (^ q (1 + g￿t)) ￿ Fs (^ q) ￿ Fs (^ qs;min (1 + g￿t))
￿t
= g^ qfs (^ q) ￿ g^ qs;minfs (^ qs;min):
Using this last expression delivers (23) and (24):
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In this Appendix, we provide additional results and the proofs of all the results stated in the
text, and depict the details of some of the robustness exercises mentioned in the text.
B-1 Proofs and Derivations
Detailed Proof of Proposition 1. Let the pro￿t be expressed as
~ ￿ (q) =
￿
" ￿ 1
"
￿" 1
" ￿ 1
^ q"￿1
= ￿^ q"￿1
Then equation (14) can be written as
￿￿l (^ q) + g^ q
@￿l (^ q)
@^ q
= ￿^ q"￿1 + ￿l ￿ ~ ws￿ if ^ q > ^ ql;min
or
￿1^ q￿1￿l (^ q) +
@￿l (^ q)
@^ q
= ￿2^ q"￿2 ￿ ￿3^ q￿1
where
￿1 ￿
￿
g
; ￿2 ￿
￿
g
and ￿3 ￿
~ ws￿ ￿ ￿l
g
and ￿ = r + ￿ + ’: Let us drop the indices (j;f) for notational convenience. Recall that for a
di⁄erential equation of the form
f (x)y (x) + y0 (x) = g (x); (B-1)
the general solution is
y (x) = e￿F(x)
￿Z
eF(x)g (x)dx + D
￿
(B-2)
where F (x) =
R
f (x)dx and D is the constant of integration. We ￿rst de￿ne the following equalities
f (^ q) ￿ ￿1^ q￿1; y (^ q) ￿ ￿l (^ q) and g (^ q) ￿ ￿2^ q"￿2 ￿ ￿3^ q￿1:
Then (28) ￿ (B-2) imply F (^ q) = ln ^ q￿1 and
￿l (^ q) = ^ q￿￿1
￿Z h
￿2^ q￿1+"￿2 ￿ ￿3^ q￿1￿1
i
dx + D
￿
=
￿2^ q"￿1
￿1 + " ￿ 1
￿
￿3
￿1
+ D^ q￿￿1:
B-1Imposing the boundary condition ￿l (^ ql;min) = 0
D =
￿3^ q
￿1
l;min
￿1
￿
￿2^ q
￿1+"￿1
l;min
￿1 + " ￿ 1
Therefore substituting back the constant term and the subindices we get
￿l (^ q) =
￿2^ q"￿1
￿1 + " ￿ 1
￿
￿3
￿1
+
"
￿3^ q
￿1
l;min
￿1
￿
￿2^ q
￿1+"￿1
l;min
￿1 + " ￿ 1
#
^ q￿￿1 (B-3)
=
￿^ q"￿1
￿ + (" ￿ 1)g
"
1 ￿
￿
^ ql;min
^ q
￿ ￿
g +"￿1#
+
￿l ￿ ~ ws￿
￿
"
1 ￿
￿
^ ql;min
^ q
￿ ￿
g
#
where ￿ ￿ r + ￿ + ’:
Now we turn to the value of high-type product line. We will focus only on the derivation of the
di⁄erential equation. The rest follows the previous results. Let us rewrite the expression in (B-3)
as
￿l (^ q) = ￿4^ q"￿1 + ￿5^ q
￿ ￿
g ￿ ￿6
where
￿4 ￿
￿
￿ + (" ￿ 1)g
; ￿5 =
￿
~ ws￿ ￿ ￿l￿
^ q
￿
g
l;min
￿
￿
￿^ q
￿
g +"￿1
l;min
￿ + g (" ￿ 1)
; and ￿6 =
~ ws￿ ￿ ￿l
￿
Recall the value of a product line of a high-type ￿rm
(￿ + ￿)￿h (^ q) +
@￿h (^ q)
@^ q
g^ q = ￿^ q"￿1 + ￿h ￿ ~ ws￿ + ￿
h
￿4^ q"￿1 + ￿5^ q
￿ ￿
g ￿ ￿6
i
for ^ q ￿ ^ ql;min
(￿ + ￿)￿h (^ q) +
@￿h (^ q)
@^ q
g^ q = ￿^ q"￿1 + ￿h ￿ ~ ws￿ for ^ ql;min > ^ q ￿ ^ qh;min
which can be rewritten as
K1￿h (^ q) ^ q￿1 +
@￿h (^ q)
@^ q
= K2^ q"￿2 + K3^ q
￿
￿+g
g ￿ K4^ q￿1
where
K1 ￿
￿ + ￿
g
; K2 ￿
￿ + ￿￿4
g
; K3 ￿
￿￿5
g
and K4 ￿
￿￿6 + ~ w￿ ￿ ￿h
g
for ^ q ￿ ^ ql;min (B-4)
K1 ￿
￿ + ￿
g
; K2 ￿
￿
g
; K3 ￿ 0 and K4 ￿
~ w￿ ￿ ￿h
g
for ^ ql;min > ^ q ￿ ^ qh;min (B-5)
We ￿rst de￿ne the following equalities
f (^ q) ￿ K1^ q￿1 and g (^ q) ￿ K2^ q"￿2 + K3^ q
￿
￿+g
g ￿ K4^ q￿1:
B-2Then we can express the general solution as
￿h (^ q) = ^ q￿K1
￿Z h
K2^ qK1+"￿2 + K3^ q
K1￿
￿+g
g ￿ K4^ qK1￿1
i
d^ q + D
￿
=
K2^ q"￿1
K1 + " ￿ 1
+
K3^ q
1￿
￿+g
g
K1 + 1 ￿
￿+g
g
￿
K4
K1
+ D^ q￿K1 (B-6)
To ￿nd the constant of integration D; we use ￿h (^ qh;min) = 0 :
D = ￿
K2^ q
K1+"￿1
h;min
K1 + " ￿ 1
￿
K3^ q
K1+1￿
￿+g
g
h;min
K1 + 1 ￿
￿+g
g
+
K4^ q
K1
h;min
K1
for ^ q 2 [^ qh;min; ^ ql;min]:
Then we can express the value function as
￿h (^ q) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
K2^ q"￿1
K1+"￿1 +
K3^ q
1￿￿+g
g
K1+1￿
￿+g
g
￿ K4
K1
+
2
4￿
K2^ q"￿1
h;min
K1+"￿1 ￿
K3^ q
1￿￿+g
g
h;min
K1+1￿
￿+g
g
+ K4
K1
3
5
￿
^ qh;min
^ q
￿K1
9
> > > > =
> > > > ;
=
2
6
6 6
6 6
6
4
K2^ q"￿1
K1+"￿1
￿
1 ￿
￿
^ qh;min
^ q
￿K1+"￿1￿
+
K3^ q
￿￿
g
K1￿ ￿
g
￿
1 ￿
￿
^ qh;min
^ q
￿K1￿ ￿
g
￿
￿K4
K1
￿
1 ￿
￿
^ qh;min
^ q
￿K1
￿
3
7
7 7
7 7
7
5
:
Hence
￿h (^ q) =
2
6 6
6 6
6 6
4
K2^ q"￿1
K1+"￿1
￿
1 ￿
￿
^ qh;min
^ q
￿K1+"￿1￿
+
K3^ q
￿￿
g
K1￿ ￿
g
￿
1 ￿
￿
^ qh;min
^ q
￿K1￿ ￿
g
￿
￿K4
K1
￿
1 ￿
￿
^ qh;min
^ q
￿K1
￿
3
7 7
7 7
7 7
5
Hence from (B-5); for ^ q 2 [^ qh;min; ^ ql;min]
￿h (^ q) =
2
4 ￿^ q"￿1
￿ + ￿ + (" ￿ 1)g
2
41 ￿
￿
^ qh;min
^ q
￿ ￿+￿+("￿1)g
g
3
5 ￿
~ w￿ ￿ ￿h
￿ + ￿
"
1 ￿
￿
^ qh;min
^ q
￿ ￿+￿
g
#3
5
This expression makes perfect sense because ￿ acts just like a destructive shock for ^ q 2 [^ qh;min; ^ ql;min]
and hence becomes part of the e⁄ective discount rate.
For ^ q ￿ ^ ql;min; the appropriate values for Ks from (B-4) delivers (B-6) as
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Next we use the boundary condition. Note that
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B-3Hence, the constant of integration for ^ q ￿ ^ ql;min must satisfy (B-7): Next using (B-4); ￿h (^ ql;min)
for ^ q ￿ ^ ql;min is found as
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which must be equal to (B-7): Equating (B-7) to (B-8) we get
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Hence for ^ q ￿ ^ ql;min
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Our next task is to ￿nd the values for ^ qk;min: Using the above di⁄erential equations we get
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From the smooth-pasting condition we get
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B-4Robustness Checks
Here we present the results of the robustness checks discussed in the text, and the results of shutting
o⁄ the selection e⁄ect, obtained by free estimating the model without ￿rm-type heterogeneity.
Table B1. Uniform Firm Types ￿H = ￿L = ￿ ￿
Panel A. Baseline
xentry x m ￿ ^ qmin drop ws
wu ￿ g Wel
11.44 4.24 51.19 96.28 16.26 0.09 14.58 9.94 2.26 100.00
Panel B. Social Planner
11.44 4.24 55.73 90.39 85.30 2.05 n/a 10.21 2.90 103.06
Table B2. Robustness Check with ￿ = 0:5 (1% of GDP)
Panel A. Baseline
xentry xl xh m ￿l ￿h ^ ql;min ^ qh;min dropl
ws
wu ￿ g Wel
8.48 1.98 8.89 64.61 64.28 21.92 10.76 0.00 0.03 15.65 8.70 2.24 100.00
Panel B. Incumbent R&D Subsidy (si = 11%)
8.48 2.21 10.19 58.45 63.41 22.78 10.39 0.00 0.03 15.93 8.68 2.24 99.88
Panel C. Operation Subsidy (so = 7%)
8.48 1.98 8.90 64.54 64.38 21.92 8.77 0.00 0.02 15.90 8.70 2.23 99.91
Panel D. Entry Subsidy (se = 4%)
8.48 1.91 8.46 66.50 64.47 21.66 12.30 0.00 0.04 16.13 8.70 2.25 100.04
Table B3. Optimal Policy with ￿ = 0:5
Panel A. Social Planner
xentry xl xh m ￿l ￿h ^ ql;min ^ qh;min dropl
ws
wu ￿ g Wel
8.48 1.87 9.51 66.05 57.36 23.38 86.75 1.39 0.42 n/a 8.90 2.86 102.0
Panel B. Optimal Incumbent and Entry Policies (si = 13%;so = ￿180%;se = 8%)
8.48 2.11 9.28 64.76 59.90 22.39 76.37 36.04 0.03 12.05 8.83 2.69 101.7
Panel C. Optimal Incumbent Policies (si = 5%;so = ￿205%)
8.48 2.11 9.28 64.76 59.90 22.39 76.36 36.04 0.03 11.08 8.83 2.69 101.7
Table B4. Robustness Check with % = 0 (1% of GDP)
Panel A. Baseline
xentry xl xh m ￿l ￿h ^ ql;min ^ qh;min dropl
ws
wu ￿ g Wel
8.98 3.67 11.13 72.73 61.95 25.82 24.87 0.00 0.07 15.57 11.68 2.24 100.00
Panel B. Incumbent R&D Subsidy (si = 15%)
8.98 3.92 12.01 67.81 61.54 26.23 24.30 0.00 0.07 15.85 11.65 2.23 99.86
Panel C. Operation Subsidy (so = 6%)
8.98 3.67 11.14 72.64 62.06 25.81 22.29 0.00 0.06 15.83 11.67 2.22 99.82
Panel D. Entry Subsidy (se = 4%)
8.98 3.60 10.89 74.03 61.95 25.71 27.25 0.00 0.08 16.02 11.68 2.25 100.1
B-5Table B5. Optimal Policy with % = 0
Panel A. Social Planner
xentry xl xh m ￿l ￿h ^ ql;min ^ qh;min dropl
ws
wu ￿ g Wel
8.98 3.25 12.30 83.03 38.16 30.55 181 0.5 1.60 n/a 12.45 5.10 111
Panel B. Optimal Incumbent and Entry Policies (si = 20%;so = ￿298%;se = 4%)
8.98 4.02 11.97 73.55 53.08 26.86 129 79.0 0.88 9.10 11.95 3.30 105.9
Panel C. Optimal Incumbent Policies (si = 17%;so = ￿315%)
8.98 4.02 11.97 73.56 53.08 26.86 129 79.1 0.88 8.72 11.95 3.30 105.9
Table B6. Robustness Check with Fixed Entrant Supply (1% of GDP)
Panel A. Baseline
xentry xl xh ￿l ￿h ^ ql;min ^ qh;min dropl
ws
wu ￿ g Wel
7.37 2.91 8.24 67.92 27.78 34.26 3.21 0.19 15.14 11.63 2.43 100.00
Panel B. Incumbent R&D Subsidy (si = 17%)
6.98 3.16 9.01 67.73 27.63 37.42 3.37 0.22 16.16 11.61 2.44 100.05
Panel C. Operation Subsidy (so = 6%)
7.36 2.90 8.23 68.19 27.75 31.00 0.00 0.17 15.43 11.62 2.41 99.82
Panel D. Entry Subsidy (se = 11%)
7.61 2.75 7.77 67.54 27.87 38.85 10.38 0.23 15.91 11.63 2.45 100.12
Table B7. Optimal Policy with Fixed Entrant Supply
Panel A. Social Planner
xentry xl xh ￿l ￿h ^ ql;min ^ qh;min dropl
ws
wu ￿ g Wel
7.78 2.88 8.98 56.7 29.8 89.57 4.68 0.79 n/a 12.09 3.05 102.62
Panel B. Optimal Incumbent and Entry Policies (si = 12%;so = ￿78%;se = 7%)
7.41 3.06 8.66 64.05 28.14 71.28 44.58 0.54 13.17 11.80 2.66 101.16
Panel C. Optimal Incumbent Policies (si = 6%;so = ￿90%)
7.41 3.06 8.65 64.07 28.14 71.12 44.40 0.54 12.33 11.80 2.65 101.16
B-6